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Appellate Jurisdiction 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code. Ann.§ 78A-4-
103(2)(h) in that this is an appeal from a domestic relations case regarding divorce. 
Issues 
Father has previously presented the issues and the associated standards. However, 
Father's description of the issues can be consolidated into two categories: 
1. Father challenges a portion of the trial court's findings supporting the ruling to 
alter the custody arrangement from what the parties had been exercising under the 
Temporary Orders. Specifically, Father challenges findings regarding moral 
character and emotional stability, ability to provide personal rather than surrogate 
care, financial condition, and which school would best for the children to attend. 
a. "We will not disturb a trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous, that is, unless they are in conflict with the clear weight of the 
evidence, or ... this court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made." Robertson v. Robertson, 2016 UT App 55, ~ 5. 
2. Father challenges the trial court's request to have Mother's fiancc testify, where he 
had been listed as a witness prior to trial but had not been excluded from the 
courtroom when the rule was invoked. 
a. A trial court's determinations regarding violations of the witness exclusion rule 
for abuse of discretion. State v. Gibson, 2016 UT App 15 ~ 12. 
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Operative Statutes and Rules 
30-3-10 Custody of children in case of separation or divorce -- Custody consideration. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their marriage is 
declared void or dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future care and custody of 
the minor children as it considers appropriate. 
(a) In determining any form of custody, including a change in custody, the court shall 
consider the best interests of the child without preference for either the mother or father 
solely because of the biological sex of the parent and, among other factors the court finds 
relevant, the following: 
(i) the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties; 
(ii) which parent is most likely to act in the best interest of the child, including 
allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent; 
(iii) the extent of bonding between the parent and child, meaning the depth, quality, 
and nature of the relationship between a parent and child; 
(iv) whether the parent has intentionally exposed the child to pornography or material 
harmful to a minor, as defined in Section 76-10-1201; and 
(v) those factors outlined in Section 30-3-10.2. 
30-3-10.2 Joint custody order -- Factors for court determination -- Public assistance. 
(1) The court may order joint legal custody or joint physical custody or both if one or 
both parents have filed a parenting plan in accordance with Section 30-3-10.8 and it 
determines that joint legal custody or joint physical custody or both is in the best interest of 
the child. 
(2) In determining whether the best interest of a child will be served by ordering joint 
legal or physical custody, the court shall consider the following factors: 
(a) whether the physical, psychological, and emotional needs and development of the 
child will benefit from joint legal or physical custody; 
(b) the ability of the parents to give first priority to the welfare of the child and reach 
shared decisions in the child's best interest; 
(c) whether each parent is capable of encouraging and accepting a positive 
relationship between the child and the other parent, including the sharing of love, affection, 
and contact between the child and the other parent; 
(d) whether both parents participated in raising the child before the divorce; 
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of the parents; 
(f) the preference of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so 
as to form an intelligent preference as to joint legal or physical custody; 
(g) the maturity of the parents and their willingness and ability to protect the child 
from conflict that may arise between the parents; 
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(h) the past and present ability of the parents to cooperate with each other and make 
decisions jointly; 
(i) any history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse, or kidnaping; and 
(j) any other factors the court finds relevant. 
(3) The determination of the best interest of the child shall be by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
(4) The court shall inform both parties that an order for joint physical custody may 
preclude eligibility for cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3, Employment 
Support Act. 
(5) The court may order that where possible the parties attempt to settle future 
disputes by a dispute resolution method before seeking enforcement or modification of the 
terms and conditions of the order of joint legal custody or joint physical custody through 
litigation, except in emergency situations requiring ex parte orders to protect the child. 
Rule 615. Excluding Witnesses 
At a party's request, the court must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear 
other witnesses' testimony. Or the court may do so on its own. But this rule does not 
authorize excluding: 
(a) a party who is a natural person; 
(b) an officer or employee of a party that is not a natural person, after being 
designated as the party's representative by its attorney; 
(c) a person whose presence a party shows to be essential to presenting the party's 
claim or defense; 
( d) a victim in a criminal or juvenile delinquency proceeding where the prosecutor 
agrees with the victim's presence; 
(e) a victim counselor while the victim is present unless the defendant establishes 
that the counselor is a material witness in that criminal or juvenile delinquency proceeding; 
or 
(f) a person authorized by statute to be present. 
Statement of the Case 
Father appeals a final trial court decision in a divorce proceeding wherein the trial 
court awarded Mother and Father joint physical custody of the two minor children. 
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Statement of Facts 
1. Mother and Father began a relationship, and as a result of that relationship two children 
were born; the oldest in 2006 and the youngest in 2009. R. 639. 
2. Mother and Father were married on February 26, 2009, shortly before the youngest child 
was born. R. 639. 
3. Father filed for divorce on August 12, 2013 (R. 1.) and filed an Amended Verified 
Petition for Divorce on September 9, 2013. 
4. Father sought joint legal custody and joint physical custody. R. 66. Specifically, Father 
requested that he be awarded 214 overnights per year and that Mother be awarded 151 
overnights per year. R. 79. 
5. In October of 2013, after a hearing in front of the Commissioner, the parties were 
awarded joint legal and joint physical custody of the children. R. 393. Specifically, the 
parties were awarded an equal amount of parent-time with the minor children, wherein 
each parent would have 7 days with the children over the course of a two-week period. 
R. 393. The Temporary Orders governed the parties' custody and parent-time for almost 
2 years. R. 937. 
6. No significant issues were brought before the court subsequent to the Temporary Orders 
hearing. The parties were unsuccessful in settling the case in mediation (R. 523) and the 
case was certified as ready to proceed to trial. R. 518-519, 564-565. 
7. The parties agreed that the primary issue to be resolved at trial was legal and physical 
custody of the minor chndrcn. R. 614. 
8. A two-day bench trial was held, beginning March 12, 2015 (R. 619-622). 
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9. During trial, Father testified that he worked a part-time job, and that he had no plans to 
work a full-time job in the near future because he wouldn't "be able to take care of the 
children the way that I do." R. 945. 
10. During the trial, evidence was also presented of a crime committed by Father in 2008 
wherein he attempted to extort an individual by threatening to disclose that the individual 
was "gay and liked to go out with other students" if the individual did not place $5,000 in 
a trash can by a certain time. Respondent's Exhibit 18. 
11. Father, who resided in the basement of his mother's home, only paid $200 per month in 
rent. R. 671, 686. However, Father did not present any evidence as to how he was 
meeting his monthly needs while working a part-time job. R. 873. 
12. While Mother was testifying, she expressed concern that Father had not always been 
caring for the children while they were in his custody. R. 1011. As evidence of this 
concern, Mother testified that she had found messages on his phone, and later on the 
home computer, wherein Father was setting up meetings with other people while he was 
supposed to be working or caring for the children. R. 1012. Mother testified that the 
emails were "inappropriate" (R. 1011) that they were of a "sexual nature." R. 1056, and 
that he was offering "sexual services." R. 1057. Mother testified that Father 
acknowledged the emails. R. 1012. 
13. During her testimony, Mother expressed a reluctance to testify about the emails, that she 
didn't want to "go into too much detail." R. 1056. However, the Court was 
uncomfortable with this, and stated "if there's some elephant in the room here, I'd like to 
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know about it." R. 1057. A third day of trial was set to discuss the issues of the emails. R. 
621-622. 
14. At the end of the second day of trial, the Court inquired as to whether or not Mother 
intended to call Mother's fiance as a witness. R. 1035. Mother indicated that there was 
no intent to do so, unless the Court wanted the fiancc to testify. R. 1035. 
15. While discussing the possibility of having the fiance testify, Father objected, stating that 
the fiance had been in the courtroom the entire time. R. 1036. 
16. The Court acknowledged the concern and the objection from Father. 1036 - 1037. 
However, the judge indicated that the wanted to "hear and see what kind of person he 
is." R. 1037. Ultimately, Father agreed to allow the fiance as a witness, so long as Father 
could move to strike testimony regarding what the fiancc had heard in the courtroom. R. 
1037. The Court agreed. R. 1037. 
17. In a memorandum decision laying out the summary of the case and listing the Court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court found that it would be in the best 
interests of the children for the parents to continue to share joint legal custody, but with 
Mother having the final decision-making authority in the event of an impasse (R. 699-
700), and that the parents would share joint legal custody with Mother being the primary 
physical custodian. R. 700. The Court determined that once school started, the 
appropriate custody arrangement was for the parents to share weekend parent-time 
(ending on Monday morning), have the children spend one night overnight with Father 
during the week, and split holidays such that Mother would have 57% of the overnights 
and Father would have 43% of the overnights. R. 694. The Court also found that it 
9 
would be in the children's best interests to change to the elementary school close to 
Mother's residence. R. 693. 
18. Ultimately, the Court found that Mother's testimony regarding the inappropriate emails 
was "speculative that [Father]'s conduct was criminal as opposed to distasteful. And, 
there was nothing indicating that the l\{inor Children's well-being or safety was ever at 
risk as a result of [Father]'s alleged activities, whatever they may have been." R. 683. 
19. However, the Court did express concern regarding Father's "ability to make sound 
decisions in the best interests of the Minor Children" due in large part to Father's 2008 
extortion attempt. R. 683. 
20. Father filed a post-judgment motion, alleging "legal errors" and requested that the Court 
amend the ruling to allow the children to stay at their original school and allow Petitioner 
to be the "primary caregiver," and maintain the 50 / 50 schedule contained in the 
Temporary Orders, among other requests. R. 709-710. The Court denied Father's post-
judgment motion, and affirmed the prior decision. R. 868-880. Father appeals. R. 921-
922. 
Summary of Arguments 
Father challenges several of the trial court's findings of fact which resulted in a ruling 
wherein the parties were awarded joint legal and physical custody, but Mother would have an 
average of nine overnights every two weeks. Father also challenges the Court's request to 
have Mother's then fiance testify as a witness to allow the Court to assess the fiance's 
potential impact on the children, where the fiancc was not excluded from the testimony 
presented prior to his examination. 
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Father fails to show that any of the challenged findings are clearly erroneous. The 
findings are adequately supported by the evidence, including witness testimony. Father also 
fails to show how fiance's testimony prejudiced Father, aside from a general allegation that 
the fiance's testimony helped Mother's case and therefore hurt Fathers case. 
Argument 
A trial court's findings of fact will be reversed as clearly erroneous only if the 
evidence presented at trial is legally insufficient to support those findings. Jacob v. Bates, 2015 
UT App 206, il 25 (qttoting]oujlas v. Fox Television Stations} Inc., 927 P.2d 170 (Utah 1996)). The 
factual findings of a trial court are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Id To 
qualify as clearly erroneous a trial court's findings [must be] either against the clear weight of 
the evidence or [must] induce a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 
Id But a finding is not clearly erroneous if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the trial court's findings, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding. Id 
I. Prostitution Allegations 
Father argues that the trial court's finding that Father had engaged in promiscuous 
conduct toward the end of the marital relationship was not supported by sufficient evidence 
because Appellee presented insufficient evidence to support her claim that she had observed 
emails and pictures wherein Father offered to exchange sex for money. 
Father's argument relics on the Court's recitation of events contained in the 
"Summary of Evidence." R. 671. However, Father has not provided all of the Court's 
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rulings that are relevant to this issue. 1 For example, Father did not include the numbered 
Finding of Fact that enumerated the Court's decision regarding his "prostitution" 
18. While the Court found [Mother] to be credible regarding some of those 
events - i.e., online dating and involvement with pornography- it was 
speculative that [Father]'s conduct was criminal as opposed to distasteful. 
And, there was nothing indicating that the Minor Children's well-being or 
safety was ever at risk as a result of [Father] 's alleged activities, whatever they 
may have been. 
R. 683 
Nor did Father include the Court's statement in the order on the post-judgment 
motion, which does not support his position that the Findings are clearly erroneous. In 
addressing Father's post-judgment motion, the Court stated that "[it] did not make findings 
that [Father] was a prostitute. On the contrary, the Court found that such allegations were 
'speculative."' R. 870. 
In the recital of events contained in the Court's memorandum decision (regarding the 
issues at trial), the district court recited much of the witnesses' testimonies, including some 
statements that do not support the Court's ultimate conclusion that Mother's testimony 
regarding observing the emails and pictures was credible. R. 673-674. After the Court made 
it recitals, however, it then conducted an analysis where it identified which evidence 
supported its conclusions. Father relies on statements made in the recitals, and ignores the 
statements made in the actual Findings of Fact. 
1 The Court specifically noted that the "portions of the Memorandum Decision that recite the background of the case 
and summarize evidence in the case reflect the Court's factual findings and legal conclusions and should be viewed as 
such, and provide further support for the numbered paragraphs of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
sections included thereafter." R. 670. Thus the summary provided support for the factual findings, and not the other 
way around. 
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Father asserts that it was somehow improper for the trial court to base findings 
regarding his moral character solely upon Mother's testimony. This assertion is without 
merit. 
Trial courts are accorded wide latitude in determining factual matters. They 
are in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to gain a 
sense of the proceeding as a whole. \Xlhere contradictory testimony is offered . 
. . , [t]he fact finder is free to weigh the conflicting evidence presented and to 
draw its own conclusions. 
Valcarce v. rztzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 314 (Utah 1998) (alteration in original) (quotations 
and citations omitted). 
Father also argues that where he had been found to have engaged in questionable 
sexual activity, and that Mother was aware the activity, it necessarily follows that Mother had 
endangered the children in some way by not acting to protect the children from the 
promiscuous activity. Appellant's Brief, 3-4. However, the Court never made any finding 
that Father had acted as a prostitute, or that he acted in an illegal manner. At best the Court 
found his activities to be "distasteful." R. 683. Therefore there is no question as to Mother's 
ability to protect the children. 
Ultimately, Father relies on his own testimony in his assertion that the Court erred in 
giving credit to Mother's testimony. The mere existence of contradictory evidence relating to 
a question of fact does not render the factfindcr's ultimate decision to believe one account 
over another, or one portion of testimony over another, without adequate support. Father 
has not shown that the Court's findings were clearly erroneous. 
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II. Child Care 
Father argues that the trial court erred in finding that he was putting the safety of his 
children at risk by leaving them alone each night while he went to work. However, this is 
once again a misstatement of what the Court actually found: 
28. Therefore, the Court concludes that the noted factor c11rrentb1 favors Greg 
because he works nights and can devote more of his time to take care of the 
Minor Children. Moving forward, however, the most likely scenario is that 
both parties will need to be gainfully employed on a full-time basis to 
adequately provide for the needs of themselves and the Minor Children as 
they mature. At that point, this factor would be neutral. 
R. 685 (emphasis in original). 
Father's brief fails to provide any citation to the record pointing to where the trial 
court determined that a step-parent household is superior to a multigenerational household. 
See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7) ("All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below 
shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule."). 
The trial court is required to undertake a comparison of the two parents in order to 
best assess what custody arrangement will be in the children's best interests. See general!J 
Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-10(1)(a); id.§ 30-3-10.2(2); Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-903. This is what 
the trial court did. 
The trial court compared the ability of the parents, both currently and in the 
foreseeable future, to provide care for the children, versus relying on surrogate care. R. 684. 
\'{!bile the Court did express concern regarding the children being left alone at night, this was 
only a function of the comparison of the two households, and not a social commentary on 
the benefits of various familial living situations. 
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Moreover, Father has not presented any argument that leaving the children, ages six 
and eight, alone for approximately five hours a night is not a relevant factor to take into 
consideration when comparing the ability of the parents to provide care for the children. 
The paternal grandmother did testify that she would see the children "daily ... usually 
at dinnertime" (R. 973) and that she was available to "attend to [the children]" if they wake 
up during the night. R. 975. However, the paternal grandmother also testified that the 
children "understood that that there's dad's house and then there's grandma's house." R. 
980. In essence, the children were encouraged to mentally separate the two households. 
This is not the same as having a caregiver in the same household, where the children, and 
the caregiver, understand that the purpose of the caregiver is to be available when needed. 
Father has not shown how the Court's concern that "in the event of emergency the 
Minor Children would be timely and adequately protected and cared for" was legally 
insufficient or against the clear weight of the evidence, nor has he created a definhe and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made. 
Father also protests that the Court provided no explanation "about why the trial 
court did not also consider Grandmother's income in Father's favor." Appellant's Brief, 11. 
However, the trial court did address this issue in the post-judgment ruling where the Court 
stated "neither [Father] nor his mother presented evidence that [Fathcr]'s mother 
contributed financially .... Accordingly, the Court cannot speculate or othe1wise infer 
circumstances when evidence supporting such alleged circumstances was never presented at 
trial." R. 873. Father has not demonstrated that the finding that Mother is in a better 
financial position because of her ability to share income with her fiance is clearly erroneous. 
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III. Schooling 
Father argues that "the trial court erred in considering only standardized test scores" 
and "diversity" in determining "which school the children should attend." Appellant's Brief, 
12. In support of this argument, Father states that the "trial court, however, did not 
consider the children's preference, their emotional needs, or the general interest of 
maintaining the status quo when it ordered the children to attend a new elementary school." 
Father failed to preserve this argument in the district court. 
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party must present the issue in the trial 
court. State v. Guard, 2015 UT 96, ~ 29 (quotin,g D01!)uan v. McDermott, 2011 UT 72, ~ 20, 266 
P.3d 839). The issue must be "specifically raised, in a timely manner, and must be supported 
by evidence and relevant legal authority." Id. 
This appeal is the first time that arguments or a suggestion of evidence regarding 
preference, impact on the children, emotional needs, or the desirability of the status quo 
have been made. 
Father did not provide any evidence as to the children's preference in schools. Father 
did not provide any evidence regarding the impact that a move would have on the children. 
Father did not provide any evidence that the children's emotional needs would not be met at 
the new school. Father did not provide any evidence that the status quo at a diverse school 
was preferable to a school that scored higher in several areas that the children's current 
school. See R. 1030 - 1031. However, Mother did provide testimony that the children's new 
school, Draper School, ranked higher than the status quo school, Beckham. See 
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Respondent's Exhibit 14 (ranking Draper School 78 in the state, as compared to Beckham's 
ranking of 525). 
In addition to not providing evidence to support his argument, Father never 
presented the argument to the trial court. 2 See generalb1 Brookside lvlobile HoJJJe Park, Ltd. v. 
Peebles, 2002 UT 48, il 14, 48 P.3d 968 ("fl]n order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue 
must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to 
rule on that issue.") 
Even if the issue were preserved, the trial court findings were not contrary to the 
clear weight of the evidence. Father's argument centers on the theory that a change in 
schools would be detrimental to the children. However, the paternal grandmother testified 
that Father had plans to move. R. 981 ("we've talked about [Father moving out] somewhere 
in the near future, you know, a year or two, that [Father] will be able to have his own place 
and I think he's planning on that."). There is no evidence that the children would have 
stayed in their current school. Thus, the children could have been moved to an academically 
superior school and disrupted now, or the children could have been potentially disrupted 
when Father moved from his mother's basement. The Court's decision to have the children 
attend an academically superior school was not against the clear weight of the evidence. 
2 Father did mention in his opening statement that the kids were doing well in school and that there was a 
desire on Father's part to "have as little disruption in their lives as possible." R. 937. However, no evidence was 
otherwise presented regarding the potential impact of disruption. I lowi:vcr, this did not give the district court the 
opportunity to rule on the issue. ,,,,er, Jj\JC. 1•. Co,mlD'Wide l/0111e Loam, foe., 2015 UT 46, ii 33, 349 P. 3d 704 (q11oti1~g 
Baird I'. Baird, 2014 UT 08, ii 20,322 P.3d 728) ("la]nd the yuestion of whether a party has preserved an issue below 
"turns on whether the district court bald] an opportunity to rule on lthe] issue.") 
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IV. Fiance's Testimony 
Finally, Father asserts that the trial court erred when Mother's fiance was allowed to 
testify despite having been present for the entirety of the trial. 
Rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "[a]t a party's request, the court 
must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear other witnesses' testimony." Utah R. 
Evid. 615. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that this rule is "directed toward preventing 
witnesses from changing their testimony based on other evidence adduced at trial." State v. 
Billsie, 2006 UT 13, ,I 10 ( citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Initially, Mother listed her fiance as a potential witness for the trial. R. 602-604. It 
could be argued that by not excluding her fiancc from the trial proceedings, Mother waived 
her right to rely on her fiance as a witness. However, it was the Court, and not Mother, who 
called the fiance as a witness. 
In discussing the possibility of having the witness testify, the judge stated "I think I 
need to hear from him," (R. 1036) and "I want to hear from him, and that probably 
outweighs any concerns that I have about ... evidence." Id. This falls within the Court's 
"broad latitude to control and manage the proceedings and preserve the integrity of the trial 
process." Bill.rie, 2006 UT 13, ,I 8. 
Father argues that the fiance's testimony should have been excluded because "the 
Court found the fiance to be a credible witness that supported Mother's position." 
Appellant's Brief, 15. Father asserts that the fiance had an unfair advantage in that he had 
the opportunity to adjust his testimony to what the fiance observed to be important to the 
trial court. 
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During the fiance's examination and cross examination, the fiance was questioned 
about his employment (R. 1095), career aspirations (R. 1096-1097), income (R. 1098), 
previous marital history (R. 1099), interactions between him and Father (R. 1099-100) and 
several other issues relevant to a determination of custody. However, Father never asked 
one question in cross examining the fiance regarding whether or not the fiance's testimony 
was being tailored to the divorce proceeding. Moreover, Father has not provided any 
evidentiary support in his current argument to show that the fiance changed his testimony in 
some "material way" because of what he heard. 
Without showing a material change in the fiance's testimony, Father has not met his 
"onus" of showing prejudice, State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981), or showing that 
the Court had abused its "discretion to decide whether a [party] will be prejudiced by 
permitting a witness to testify in the face of a violation of the witness exclusion rule. Carlson, 
635 P.2d at 74. See also Billsie, 2006 UT 13, ,r 6 (stating that a trial court's decision to exempt a 
witness will be affirmed if "the challenged practice is not inherently prejudicial, or the 
defendant fails to show actual prejudice" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Conclusion 
Father has failed to show how any of the challenged findings are clearly erroneous. 
All of the findings are supported by witness testimony or other evidence. Further, Father has 
not shown how Mother's fiance's testimony prejudiced Father's case. The testimony was 
relevant to the custody issues presented to the trial court, and it was within the trial court's 
discretion to allow the fiance to testify. The trial court ruling should be affirmed. 
19 
• 
D ATE D this 18th day of April, 2016. 
Russe auney 
Attorney for AppetJee 
• 
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Memorandum Decision, 
Order, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law 
.\ 
GREG J. POPE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
CARMEN R. POPE, 
Respondent. 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, ST A TE OF UT AH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
MEMORANDUM DECISION, ORDER, 
FINDINGS OFF ACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OFLAW 
Case No.: 134904171 
Judge: Barry G. Lawrence 
This matter was filed on August 12, 2013. A bench trial was scheduled for March 12 
through March 13, 2015, which principally addressed the issue of custody and related issues. 
Petitioner Greg Pope testified along with his mother Deanna Taylor and his sister Emily 
Wheedon. Respondent Carmen Pope testified along with her mother Carolyn Worrell and her 
fiance Jeremy Barnes. During the testimony of Carmen Pope, an issue arose concerning Greg's 
alleged promiscuous and potentially illegal conduct in the past. Greg requested a continuance to 
discover into the matter and the matter was continued. The conclusion of the trial took place on 
May 14, 2015. At that time, Greg, Carmen, Ms. Wheedon and Ms. Worrell all testified again on 
limited issues. The Court then heard closing arguments and took the matter under advisement. 
The Court, having heard evidence, received exhibits, and heard argument of counsel and 
the parties, and now being fully advised, hereby issues this Memorandum Decision, Order and 
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Factual Findings. 
The Court notes that the portions of the Memorandum Decision that recite the 
background of the case and summarize evidence in the case reflect the Court's factual findings 
and legal conclusions and should be viewed as such, and provide further support for the 
numbered paragraphs of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law sections included 
thereafter. 
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
The parties met in early 2004, Greg was 19 years old and Carmen was 16 years old. For a 
period of time in the past, the couple resided in Maryland. In October 2008, Greg was charged 
and convicted of felony extortion, when he tried to extort $5,000 from a fellow student, under 
threat that he would publicize that the student was gay. The most troubling aspect of this 
criminal episode is that Greg took his two-year-old son Gregory, born December 10, 2006, to the 
location where he was to pick up the $5,000 in extortion money. Greg was arrested and the 
young child was taken into protective custody. Greg served time in a Maryland jail, during 
which time Carmen traveled back and forth from Utah to Maryland and remained supportive of 
him. After his release, the parties moved back to Utah and were married and continued b to 
travel back to Maryland for Greg's court appearances and work release. 
Despite Greg's conviction, the parties were married on February 26, 2009, and their 
second son Damien I was born on May 19, 2009. In late 2012, the parties began to experience 
problems in their marriage and they separated on or around April 1, 2013. This matter was filed 
on August 12, 2013. 
'The parties children, Gregory and Damien, will hereinafter be referred to as the "Minor Children." 
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At the time of separation, the parties lived together in West Valley City. After 
separation, Greg moved out of the marital residence, and the Minor Children stayed primarily 
with Carmen. At all times the parties have enjoyed a joint legal and physical custody relationship 
with the Minor Children. 
Temporary orders were entered by Commissioner T. Patrick Casey on February 14, 2014. 
On the issue of custody the temporary orders stated as follows: 
Custody: (a) the parties will maintain full joint physical and legal custody of the minor 
children, GP and DP. In this regard, and for the purposes of these temporary orders, the 
children's nights will be split evenly with each parent. The children will spend every 
Monday through Wednesday night with the father, and every Friday through Sunday night 
with the mother. The parents will then alternate having the children for every other 
Thursday night. (b) The allocation of major holidays should be mutually agreed upon by 
the parties. 
Order, Feb. 14, 2014. Since the temporary order was issued, Greg has resided at 112 North Jazz 
Court, Salt Lake City, UT 84116. He resides in the basement apartment of the building owned 
by his mother. Carmen lives in a townhouse in at 14947 South Sycamore Hill Draper Utah. 
Carmen has a fiance, Jeremy Barnes, and they intend to marry on June 30, 2015. 
II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE 
A. Petitioner, Greg Pope 
Greg Pope testified at length. By all accounts he appears to be a good father, has 
genuine love for his children, is very attentive to their needs, and remains very involved in their 
life. He currently works nights as a janitor and devotes much of his time during the day taking 
care of the children before and after school. And, he spends much time volunteering at the 
children's current school, Backman Elementary School ("Backman"). His schedule revolves, to 
a large extent, around the Minor Children's schedule. 
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Greg lives in the basement of his mother's house. It is a separate, 1300 square foot 
apartment with two bedrooms. The Minor Children share a bedroom. The basement apartment 
has its own entrance. As noted, Greg has a part-time job as a janitor at a school that is 
approximately ten minutes from his home. However, Greg works at night and leaves the children 
alone from 9:00 p.m. until about 2:00 a.m. The Court finds this troubling, especially given the 
ages of the Minor Children, currently 8 and 6 years old respectively. Both Greg and his mother, 
Deanna Taylor, testified that his mother is upstairs every evening and can hear the children if 
they needed anything, but that did not happen very often. However, it is a reasonable safety 
concern to the Court that two small children are left alone each night. While it is commendable 
that Greg is attempting to accommodate his work schedule to spend more time with the Minor 
Children, Greg is making such accommodations to the detriment of a full-time income and 
possibly the safety and well-being of his children. 
One of the significant issues in this cases is determining in which school the children 
should enroll. Greg testified that Backman is a very diverse school with an 80% Hispanic 
population which he prefers because the Minor Children are Hispanic. He testified that the 
Minor Children are thriving in their current school and that he is available to volunteer there. 
Greg also testified that he hopes to be working there in the fall as a teacher's assistant during 
school hours, although that is not yet certain. The Minor Children have a fairly regimented life 
with Greg; Greg seems fairly organized in the manner in which he handles the Minor Children's 
daily schedule. He testified that pick-ups and drop-offs have been problematic because of 
Carmen's alleged unreliable work schedule. However, given his relatively open schedule, it is 
reasonable that Greg can be more cooperative with Carmen in that regard. 
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Greg also testified that he believes he is better equipped to handle the "legal issues" for 
the Minor Children such as healthcare and education. Greg alleged that on one occasion Carmen 
would not agree to change health insurers, despite it being less expensive and providing better 
coverage. However, pursuant to all the testimony presented, Carmen did not agree to the change 
because she feared Greg was trying to bully her. Regardless, Carmen must in the future put the 
Minor Children's interests first. 
Greg addressed various alleged marital debts, but failed to provide a compelling reason 
why those debts -which all appear to be marital debts- should not be split 50/50 between the 
parties. 
As previously noted, Greg is underemployed, working only part-time as a janitor. Greg 
stated that he had difficulty finding a job because of his prior felony conviction. However, 
Greg's 2008 felony conviction has been expunged and so now, Greg asserts that he will be able 
to get a better job in the future. He hopes to work at the neighborhood school in the fall, but that 
too would only be part-time employment. While there is a concern of Greg's underemployment, 
the fact that he has primarily spent his time taking care of the Minor Children cannot be 
overlooked. 
A large part of the trial focused upon Greg's moral character. The 2008 incident in 
Maryland is particularly troubling to the Court. First, an extortion scheme obviously calls into 
question Greg's veracity, credibility, and capacity to make sound decisions. However, the Court 
also recognizes the Greg's actions occurred approximately seven (7) years ago. Greg completed 
his sentence and the charge has been expunged. Even so, the most troubling aspect of this 
episode was the remarkably bad decision that Greg made to bring his two-year-old to the scene of 
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the crime, where Greg was eventually arrested and the child taken into protective custody. In 
light of that, the Court has significant concerns regarding Greg's capacity to make sound 
decisions for the Minor Children. 
Carmen, Respondent and the mother of the Minor Children also raised an issue 
concerning Greg's alleged promiscuous conduct toward the end of their relationship. Carmen 
alleged that Greg"prostituted" himself on Craigslist for money. Carmen spoke about finding 
emails - which she claims she later destroyed - on a home computer referencing this and photos 
of Greg's genitals and of transgender models on his USB drive. Although Carmen appeared to 
be reluctant to fully address Greg's alleged actions, in determining the best needs of the Minor 
Children, the Court urged Carmen to fully disclose her findings with the Court. Based upon 
Carmen's reluctance to address the issue, the Court found her to be credible, i.e., she did not 
want to use the incidents as a "sword" against Greg. Moreover, Carmen's testimony appeared to 
be genuine and she was extremely emotional. While Carmen's testimony lacked sufficient detail 
and her reasons for destroying Greg's email was tenuous, there is no basis for the Court to find 
that Cannen's account of the photos, etc., was fabricated. Moreover, although the Court believes 
that Carmen was telling the truth about finding various materials on the computers and USB 
drives at home, the Court does not believe there is sufficient evidence to show that Greg's 
actions were illegal or otherwise placed the Minor Children in harm's way. Also, Carmen 
readily admitted that she engaged in "phone sex" and sent nude photographs of herself to 
someone she met online after the parties separated, but while the Minor Children were living 
with her. Notably, Greg vehemently denied all of the allegations made against him by Carmen. 
Notwithstanding the discrepancies of the parties' statements, the primary concern of the Court is 
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the best interest of the children and the possible ramifications that either party's conduct may 
have thereo£ And, despite the troubling nature of the accusations, nothing indicated to the Court 
that either parent acted in a way that compromised the Minor Children's safety. 
B. Deanna Taylor, Petitioner's Mother 
Greg's mother, Deanna Taylor testified. Ms. Taylor testified about the living conditions 
of Greg and the Minor Children. She also testified that when Greg leaves the Minor Children at 
night, she is able to hear them and if necessary, can attend to the needs of the Minor Children, 
although she said that this does not happen often. Ms. Taylor further testified that Carmen had a 
good bond with the Minor Children. 
Greg sought to rely on Ms. Taylor's "expert opinions" based on her 32-years of 
experience in the education field. Ms. Taylor opined that parental involvement and diversity for 
students are positive things that should be reinforced. While her opinions were somewhat self-
evident, Ms. Taylor was never identified as an expert, nor qualified as an expert witness to 
testify in this matter. Accordingly, the Court only gives slight weight to those opinions. 
C. Emily Wheedon, Petitioner's Sister 
Greg's sister, Emily Weeden also testified. Although an obvious biased supported, Ms. 
Wheedon testified about the "really great relationship" Greg has with the Minor Children. 
Notably, during the parties' marriage, Ms. Wheedon was friendly with Carmen and she endorsed 
Carmen as a mother and acknowledged Carmen's positive parenting abilities. 
D. Carolyn Worrell, Respondent's Surrogate Mother 
Carolyn Worrell, Carmen's surrogate mother also testified. Ms. Worrell married 
Carmen's foster father and has acted as Carmen's mother since she was a teenager. Ms. Worrell, 
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along with Carmen's biological mother were involved in a polygamist marriage. Ms. Worrell 
likewise had a strong bias in favor of her daughter and provided minimally probative testimony 
about Carmen's abilities as a parent. Ms. Worrell also testified about a conversation she had 
with Greg where he allegedly mentioned going to sex addiction therapy. Greg denied that it the 
sessions were to address sex addiction, but instead, he was in therapy to address his prior sexual 
abuse when he was young. Regardless of the basis for Greg's therapy, the Court did not find Ms. 
Worrell's testimony to be particularly helpful. 
E. Carmen Pope, Respondent 
Carmen testified at length. She was extremely emotional during much of her testimony. 
She was only 16 years old when she met Greg and is only 27 today. Carmen currently lives in a 
two-bedroom townhouse in Draper and has a stable job working as the office manager for a 
pediatric dentist office. She is engaged to Jeremy Barnes, who works for the Salt Lake County 
Sheri fr s office, and they plan to marry on June 30, 2015. 
Carmen cares deeply about the Minor Children and wants to give them the best life she 
possibly can. She was somewhat fragile on the witness stand and became quite flustered during 
cross-examination. However, the Court considered her to be credible, genuine, and forthright. 
Carmen was very emotional when relaying the events of Greg's October 2008 arrest, in large part 
because her two-year-old was taken into custody, at a time when she was pregnant with their 
second child. Notably, even after Greg's arrest, Carmen remained supportive of Greg, and 
shuttled back and forth to Maryland to help support him. And, despite that episode, she married 
him. 
Eventually, the couple moved back to Utah in mid-2010 and lived in a townhouse in West 
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Valley City. During their marriage, Carmen worked a part-time day job and Greg worked a part-
time night job, so the two were able to divide their parenting responsibilities accordingly. The 
parties then moved to West Jordan at which time Carmen eventually became employed full-
time, received promotions, and currently earns $18.50 per hour. After the parties began having 
problems, they went to marriage counseling. It was at that time Carmen claims she discovered 
that Greg was "meeting people" on line. She candidly admitted doing the same. At first, after 
the separation Greg moved out and Carmen continued to reside with the Minor Children in West 
Jordan. However, due to the parties' schedules, the parties agreed to the temporary custody plan 
imposed by Commissioner Casey in or about February 2014, whereby Greg had the children 
during the week and Carmen on the weekends. This schedule allowed Greg to be home during 
the days with the Minor Children and allowed Carmen to tend to them on weekends when she 
was not working. 
Carmen testified about some co-parenting problems and testified that Greg was inflexible 
and uncooperative. She testified credibly about his conduct which led the Court to have concerns 
of his ability to promote a joint custody arrangement, particularly given his clear animosity 
towards Carmen's fiance, as evidenced by some crude text messages. Moreover, at the March 
hearing, Greg refused to grant Carmen a bifurcated divorce. There appeared to be no viable 
reason for that, aside from spite, and he later relented after speaking with his attorney. Carmen, 
however, appears to be better able to foster a relationship between the other parent and the Minor 
Children. 
Carmen testified about the two school options for the Minor Children in Draper, although 
she acknowledged she had not been to either school yet and had not investigated an after-school 
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program. She produced evidence that the potential school for the Minor Children, Draper 
Elementary School, is ranked 78th in the state while Backman is ranked 525th out of 556. 
Carmen relied on a KSL ranking, which was published in the Salt Lake Tribune. The Court 
allowed that into evidence over the Petitioner's objection as some evidence of the relative 
strength of the two schools. While the Court recognizes that the parameters of those rankings are 
not entirely known, they were published by a locally reputable source and relied on standardized 
math and reading scores. See Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976) ("The 
trial court is given considerable discretion in deciding whether or not evidence submitted is 
relevant.") Moreover, the glaring disparity between the schools is a statistically significant 
distinction by any measure. And, notably, Greg never sought to explain or contradict Backman's 
poor performance. 
Carmen also acknowledged the parties' debts and did not provide any reason to the Court 
why such debt should not be equally distributed. 
Carmen hopes that within a few years after she marrying Jeremy, she will be a stay-at-
home mom, although the evidence was unclear about how they would financially be able to do 
that. 
Carmen did not have a valid reason for rejecting Greg's request to put the Minor Children 
on a CHIP insurance plan which appears to be less expensive and provide better coverage. She 
claims it was because she believed he was bullying her. The Court is concerned that in doing so, 
Carmen let her disdain for Greg prevent her from acting in the best interest of the Minor 
Children. 
Notably, through all of her trials and tribulations with Greg, Carmen still endorses him as 
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a father and supports the idea of a joint parenting plan. She acknowledged that the Minor 
Children seem to be doing well in school and that Greg has been involved in school activities. 
Carmen noted that she became unhappy with the temporary plan shortly after Commissioner 
Casey instituted it and has been working ever since then to have the plan revert to what it was 
before, when she was able to see the Minor Children during the week. 
F. Jeremy Barnes, Respondent's Fiance 
Jeremy Barnes, Carmen's fiance, testified. Mr. Barnes is a 32-year-old police officer 
working for Salt Lake County. He testified of Carmen's positive parenting abilities and his 
good relationship with the Minor Children. Mr. Barnes appeared to be a credible witness and a 
positive role model as the Minor Children's future step-parent. There was nothing to indicate 
that he did not have a good relationship with the Minor Children. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
PREVIOUS ORDERS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. The parties met in early 2004 when Petitioner was 19 years old and Respondent was 16 years 
old. 
2. Their first son, Gregory was born on December I 0, 2006 . 
3. The parties were married on February 26, 2009. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Their second son, Damien was born on May 19, 2009. 
The parties separated on April 1, 2013. This matter was filed on August 12, 2013. 
Temporary orders were entered by Commissioner Casey on February 14, 2014. Under that 
Order, the Minor Children spent weekdays with Greg and weekends with Carmen, with 
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alternating Thursdays. 
CUSTODY CONSIDERATIONS 
7. Both parties seek a joint legal and physical custody arrangement; however, each wants the 
ultimate decision-making authority, each wants to be the primary custodian, and each wants 
the Minor Children to attend his/her local school. 
8. The parties have stipulated to a 50/50 split parent time during summers. That agreement and 
all terms thereof, are to be included in the final divorce decree. 
9. Both parents appear to be caring parents, have good relationships with the Minor Children, 
and would like to remain involved in their lives. However, the practical realities of this case, 
and most significantly the fact that the parties now live approximately 20 miles away from 
each other, makes a pure 50/50 joint relationship impractical. 
10. Although one of the goals of a custodial order is to allow each parent to share an equal 
amount of time with the children, it does not appear that an entirely joint, i.e. 50/50, 
arrangement is feasible here without significantly disrupting the Minor Children's lives. That 
is, because the Minor Children will attend school either in Carmen's neighborhood or in 
Greg's neighborhood, it will be virtually impossible and impractical for the other party to 
spend the same amount of time with the Minor Children. Accordingly, the Court undertakes 
the custody analysis to determine which parent shall be deemed the primary decision-maker 
and the primary custodian of the Minor Children. Accordingly, the Court analyzes the 
statutory factors for determining custody. See Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10, -10.2. 
11. The children's preference. The minimal evidence on this factor was that each parent has a 
good relationship with each of the Minor Children. There was some testimony from Carmen 
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that appeared to suggest that the Minor Children are sad when they are transported to Greg on 
Monday mornings. That, however, was unspecific and could be due to the early drop-off 
after the weekend. The Court was not persuaded that the Minor Children preferred one 
parent or the other. Accordingly, this factor is neutral. 
12. The benefit of keeping siblings together. The Minor Children have been together during 
their entire lives and neither party has suggested an arrangement that would separate them. 
Accordingly, the Court will only consider a custody arrangement that will keep the Minor 
Children together. 
13. The relative strength of the child's bond with one or both of the prospective custodians. All 
of the evidence that was adduced at trial indicated that each parent has developed strong 
bonds with each of the Minor Children. There is nothing to indicate that one parent has a 
stronger bond with either child than the other. Accordingly, this factor is neutral. 
14. The general interest in maintaining the status quo and continuing previously determined 
custody arrangements where the child is happy and well adjusted. The current visitation 
schedule has been in place for two years. Greg has the children during the week and Carmen 
has them on weekends. This is a somewhat unconventional arrangement, but given the 
parties current work schedules, the schedule has worked. Carmen has the Minor Children on 
weekends and Greg is able to spend time with them during the week before, during, and after 
school. 
15. The Court is mindful, however, of the fact that this Court's order will be in place for the next 
fourteen years, barring any future requests for modifications. And, given that Greg's part-
time work history, it is difficult to predict how long he will be at his current job and what 
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kind of job he may have in the future. It does appear, however, even with Greg's limited rent 
payment to his parents of $200 a month, that in order to appropriately provide for the Minor 
Children he will likely need to obtain full-time employment at some point in the future, and 
at that point would be unable to spend as much time with the Minor Children during the 
weeks. And, as the Minor Children grow and become preteens and teenagers, it may not be 
an ideal scenario in which the Minor Children to go to school during the week in one area of 
the valley, yet spend weekends in a different area, thereby, limiting the Minor Children's 
access to their friends and activities. Accordingly, the Court does not believe the current 
schedule will be realistic and practical in the future as the children mature. Thus, although 
the current schedule works at this time, the factor does not preponderate in favor of 
maintaining that current schedule going forward. 
16. Factors relating to the prospective custodians' character or status or their capacity or 
willingness to function as parents, including: Moral character and emotional stability. One 
of central issues in this case concerns Greg's criminal past. The evidence demonstrated that 
Greg tried to extort $5,000 from a fellow student in Maryland, upon threat that he would 
"out" that person's sexual orientation. Although this happened seven (7) years ago and Greg 
has completed his sentence, the event brings into question Greg's moral character and even 
more. disconcerting, the lack of judgment that he showed in having his child present during 
the events of that crime. Bringing one's child to the commission of a crime is the antithesis 
of being a good parent. Moreover, at trial, Greg did not convince the Court that he 
appreciated the gravity of his past actions. 
17. There was additional testimony by Carmen about questionable events about Greg that led her 
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to believe that he may be "prostituting" himself for money. Specifically, Carmen made 
allegations of Greg's involvement with transgender people and his involvement with 
pornography. 
18. While the Court found Carmen to be credible regarding some of those events - i.e., online 
dating and involvement with pornography- it was speculative that Greg's conduct was 
criminal as opposed to distasteful. And, there was nothing indicating that the Minor 
Children's well-being or safety was ever at risk as a result of Greg's alleged activities, 
whatever they may have been. Additionally, Carmen concedes that she similarly engaged in 
questionable conduct, i.e., having a long distance on-line relationship with a person and 
engaging in unspecified "phone sex." Finally, although there was nothing solidly linking 
Greg to defined criminal behavior, the Court did find Carmen to be a credible witness. Thus, 
Greg's categorical denials of the alleged conduct causes the Court to question his veracity 
and honesty. 
19. In light of all the noted facts and circumstances, and especially the criminal incident in 
Maryland, the Court has serious reservations regarding Greg's ability to make sound 
decisions in the best interests of the Minor Children. See Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 
197 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("' Moral standards' are a statutory consideration, and may be 
relevant to a custody determination to the extent they affect the children's best interests." 
( citations omitted)). 
20. The gravity of this factor and the possibility of its effects upon the Minor Children weighs 
heavily in favor of Carmen. 
2 I. Ability to Function as a Parent. There is nothing in the record to suggest any problem and/or 
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issue that would impede either party's ability to function as a parent. Moreover, both parties 
seem to acknowledge that the other is a capable parent, and has agreed in the past, and has 
agreed for all summers going forward, that there should be a 50/50 split of parent time. This 
is perhaps the best indicator that both parents are capable of functioning as good parents, and 
believe that the other is capable as well. This factor is neutral. 
22. Duration and depth of desire for custody. Both parents appeared to be sincere about their 
desire for custody and of maintaining a relationship with each of the Minor Children. The 
Court believes that both parents are sincere in their desire to have as much time with the 
Minor Children as possible. This factor is neutral. 
23. Ability to provide personal rather than surrogate care. Greg works in the evenings and thus 
has his weekdays available to take care of the Minor Children. Accordingly, under the 
current arrangement, a parent is with the minor children before and after school. Moreover, 
Greg is able to spend a significant amount of time volunteering at the Minor Children's 
school. 
24. However, it is unclear to the Court whether Greg will be able to continue with such a plan 
going forward. Greg earns only $13.00 per hour in a part-time position. To accommodate 
his part-time earnings, Greg lives in his mother's house and foregoes child care while he is at 
work - which is concerning to the Court because the young children are left unattended 
during the evening hours. 
25. Accordingly, while this factor might favor Greg now, it only does so temporarily. At some 
point, to adequately provide for the needs of his growing Minor Children, he will likely need 
to obtain full-time employment and would thus not be able to dedicate as much time at home 
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with the Minor Children. 
26. On the other hand, Carmen works a full-time job and would need to rely upon after school 
care. After she marries, her new husband will likely be able to be a surrogate caretaker of the 
Minor Children. 
27. The future is unclear for both parties. Carmen would like to become a stay at home mother, 
but it does not appear she will be in a financial position to do so. Similarly, Greg would like 
to continue to work part-time, but that too may be unrealistic. No concrete evidence was 
provided that persuaded the Court that the parties' aspirations were reasonable, at least from 
an economic perspective. 
28. Therefore, the Court concludes that the noted factor currenlly favors Greg because he works 
nights and can devote more of his time to take care of the Minor Children. Moving forward, 
however, the most likely scenario is that both parties will need to be gainfully employed on a 
full-time basis to adequately provide for the needs of themselves and the Minor Children as 
they mature. At that point, this factor would be neutral. 
29. Significant impairment of ability to function as a parent through drug abuse, excessive 
drinking or other causes. Neither of the parties raised any concerns as to whether the 
opposing party's ability to function was impaired by drug or alcohol abuse. And, although 
there was some suggestion that Greg had an alleged "sex addiction", the evidence at trial was 
less than clear; and, nothing was presented to the Court to indicate that this was a problem or 
that it affected his ability to parent or otherwise presented a risk to the Minor Children. 
Accordingly, this factor is neutral. 
30. Reasons for having relinquished custody in the past. There is no evidence before the Court 
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that either party has voluntarily or otherwise lost custody. 
31. Religious compatibility with the child. This has not been raised as a concern and is thus 
neutral. 
32. Kinship. including in extraordinary circumstances stepparent status. Greg lives with his 
mother and the scant evidence appears to support that she has a good relationship with the 
Minor Children. 
33. There was no testimony about any current relationship for Greg. 
34. Carmen's fiance, Jeremy Barnes, testified and appears to have a good relationship with the 
Minor Children as well. The Court, having observed Mr. Barnes testify, believes that he 
testified credibly, cares for the Minor Children, and will likely act as a capable and caring 
step-parent. There was no evidence presented to the Court to the contrary. 
35. Accordingly, this factor slightly favors Carmen. 
36. Financial condition. Greg works a part-time job as a nighttime janitor for a school in Salt 
Lake City and his monthly take-home pay is slightly above a minimum wage earner. He 
lives in a basement apartment in his mother's home and pays $200 a month in rent. In light 
of the needs of the Minor Children as they mature, the Court is skeptical that he will be able 
to continue with this arrangement for an indefinite time. And while there was no evidence to 
suggest that he would not be able to continue to live in his mother's basement apartment, his 
current situation is not ideal. Moreover, continuing the current schedule - i.e., exposing the 
Minor Children to risk each night by leaving them unattended - is something that should not 
be permitted to continue in the best interest of the Minor Children. 
37. Accordingly, the living situation for the Minor Children at Greg's current residence is 
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concerning and not sustainable. The Minor Children are left unattended in his basement 
apartment while he works nights. And, even though Greg's mother alleges that she will tend 
to the Minor Children if there is a problem, the Court is not convinced that in the event of 
emergency the Minor Children would be timely and adequately protected and cared for. And, 
it is a further concern that as the children age, they will be unsupervised at night. 
38. Carmen's financial situation is better than Greg's. While Greg earns approximately $13.00 
per hour part-time, Carmen works a full-time job at a pediatric dentist office earning 
approximately $18.50 per hour. 
39. Carmen lives in a townhouse apartment and appears to be making ends meet. She plans to 
marry Jeremy at the end of June and will thus be adding his income to the family. Although, 
based on his testimony, it is uncertain what position he will be working in the future and what 
his income will be. In any event, Carmen's household financial situation is better than 
Greg's. 
40. Both parents maintain a separate bedroom in their residence that the Minor Children share 
when in their house. The photographs presented at trial of Carmen's apartment reflects a 
clean and safe environment. Although Greg did not submit any photographs, there was no 
testimony that would cause the Court concern of the physical living arrangements of the 
Minor Children in Greg's apartment (aside from the arrangement whereby they are left 
unattended at night.). 
41. This factor favors Carmen. 
42. Evidence of abuse of the subject child. another child, or spouse. There have been no 
allegations of abuse of the children. This factor is neutral. 
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43. The Ability of each parent to support a positive relationship with the other. Both parties have 
engaged in immature conduct vis-a-vis the other that brings into question whether either 
parent will be able to foster a positive relationship between the children and the other parent. 
Carmen refused to enroll the children in the CHIP insurance program even though it provided 
better coverage at a better price than the insurance they had. This appeared to be borne out of 
spite and simply not wanting to be cooperative with Greg. This conduct was not in the best 
interests of the Minor Children. 
44. Similarly, Carmen alleges that Greg has been uncooperative when dealing with pick-ups and 
drop-offs of the Minor Children and doctors visits and schools. Moreover, it was clear, 
especially from some crude text messages, that Greg may be unable to support a positive 
relationship with Jeremy, Carmen's soon-to-be husband and step-parent of the Minor 
Children. Pursuant to the Court's findings, both parties will need to make efforts in fostering 
a positive relationship between the Minor Children and the other parent. Moreover, both 
Cannen and Greg will need to do a better job of keeping the other fully informed of the 
Minor Children and their related school activities/schedules, medical appointments, etc. 
45. Given both parties' shortcomings on this issue, this factor is neutral. 
46. Communications between the parties. As addressed above, the Court is concerned that both 
parents have acted in an immature manner toward the other and thereby encourages and 
orders the parties moving forward to be open and cooperative with the other. For now, this 
factor too is neutral. 
47. Other Considerations: There was a discussion at trial regarding the best school choice for 
the Minor Children. The school in Greg's area is Backman Elementary School. Draper 
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Elementary is the school in Carmen's district. The KSL Report, submitted by Carmen, 
reflected that the Draper school was ranked 78th in the state while the Backman school was 
rated 525th out of 561 schools. Although it was a summary report, KSL is a reputable media 
source and the rankings appear to have been based on standardized test scores. The Draper 
school scored 86.30 in language arts and 88.17 in math, while the Backman school's numbers 
were 52.53 and 59.25, respectively. And importantly, nothing was presented by Greg that 
addressed Backman's low ranking. Given the disparity of the rankings, the Court accepts this 
as some statistically significant evidence of the comparative strength of the two schools, and 
is persuaded that the Draper school would be the better option for the Minor Children. See 
Bambrough, 552 P.2d at 1290. 
48. And, while Greg argued that the ethnic diversity of Backman should be considered, the 
significant disparity between the schools' academic rankings outweighs any benefits of an 
ethnically diverse culture. 
49. Based on the parties' testimony at trial, and each party's proposal, the Court determines that 
it is in the best interest of the children to maintain a visitation arrangement that allows them 
to maximize their time with both parents. 
50. Under the circumstances, however, the Court finds that a true 50/50 joint relationship is not 
workable given the uncertainty of the parties' future status (i.e., employment, relationships, 
etc.), the distance between the households, as well as the other factors stated above. 
51. Accordingly, one of the parties will have to be deemed the primary physical custodian of the 
children. Based on a balancing of all of the factors set forth above, the Court finds that the 
primary custodian shall be Carmen. The Court's visitation schedule is stated below. 
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L EGAL CUSTODY 
52. The Court finds that it is in the bes! interests or the Minor Child ren lo have an arrangement 
,vhcreby both parents remain closely involved in rearing or the Minor Children, 10 the e:-; tent 
possible. 
53. The Court finds and concl udes !hat given the eviclern:c presented. and the reasonable 
in ferences therefrom. a true 50/50 join t legal custody arrangement cannot work; one of the 
parties needs to have ultimate decision-making authority . 
54. In consideration or the factors addressed above. supra. and given the Court's concern over 
Greg 's criminal conduct in the past, and his less stable current financial status and living 
condit ions, Carmen shall be the person delegated with the ult imate decision making authority 
on al l nrnttcrs signi licant to the upbringing of the tvlinor Children. such as education, medical 
care. extra-curricula r ac1i,·i1ies. etc. 
55. While it is in the best interests or the Minor Children fo r both parents to share in the joint 
legal custody or the .iVl inor Children. and 10 both have input on all significant matters 
incl uding but not li mited to education. medical care, parent-time and extracurricular 
activities. in the event the panics cannot agree on a dec ision regarding any of these issues, 
Carmen shall make the fi nal decis ion. 
56. Accordingly. the onus wil l be on Carmen to ensure that Greg is well-informed of' the Minor 
Children· s education. 111cdical care, parent-time. e:-;tracurricular acti vities. etc. Carmen shall 
send Greg a 111on1h ly e-111~1il. before the first of each month, outlining and detai ling any and 
all signilieant dates. school deadlines or events, medical appointments, extracurricular 
deadli nes and events. de .. fo r the fo llowing month. Carmen is requi red 10 consider Greg·s 
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input on those issues in good faith. Greg shall also be expected to keep Carmen timely 
informed of any activities, events, etc., affecting or otherwise, altering the Minor Children's 
routines, schooling, etc. Proceeding in this matter requires both parties to be fully informed 
of, and thus give input into, all important decisions. However, Carmen - as noted - will be 
the ultimate decision-maker. 
57. The parties are to share all expenses regarding the Minor Children on a 50/50 basis. This 
includes all of their healthcare costs, as well as the costs related to their educational and 
extracurricular activities. The parent who incurs the initial expense shall provide written 
verification of the cost, which would include a copy of a receipt, invoice, etc., within thirty 
(30) days of payment to the other parent. Within thirty (30) days of receiving the notice of 
the incurred expense, the other parent shall submit his/her reimbursement share. 
58. In regards to health insurance coverage for the Minor Children, within thirty (30) days of 
service of this ruling and order, Carmen and Greg are to meet and confer as to options 
regarding health insurance coverage for the Minor Children, which may include continuing 
with the current plan, placing them on Jeremy's plan, etc. The parties are to strive to provide 
health care options that will ensure the Minor Children shall have the best possible coverage 
at a reasonable rate. In the event the parties are unable to agree, Carmen shall make the final 
decision. As noted above, costs affiliated with health care, including any costs affiliated with 
premiums, shall be shared equally among the parties. 
59. Greg shall be entitled to claim relevant tax exemptions for Gregory every year and Carmen 
shall be entitled to claim relevant tax exemptions for Damien every year. However, if in any 
given year, one party is unable to take advantage of the financial benefit of the tax exemption, 
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the other party shall be allowed to claim the minor child as a dependent for that year. The 
parties shall inform each other by January 31 if they will not receive a financial benefit by 
claiming his/her designated child as a dependent for filing of the previous tax year. The year 
after Greg may no longer legally declare Gregory as a dependent, he shall be entitled to 
declare Damien as a dependent in odd years and Carmen may claim the exemption for 
Damien in even years. 
PHYSICAL CUSTODY AND PARENT TIME PLAN 
60. The Court finds that it is in the Minor Children's best interest that they interact with each 
parent as much as possible and as close to a 50/50 time split to the extent practicable. 
61. Therefore, it is in the best interests of the Minor Children for both parents to share in the joint 
physical custody of the Minor Children, with Carmen being designated as the primary 
custodial parent. 
62. This schedule presumes that Carmen will continue to reside in her current location and 
within the boundaries of Draper Elementary School. And, that the Minor Children will attend 
Draper Elementary or upon timely notice to Greg, another similarly ranked school in the area 
of Carmen's residence. 
63. In order to best serve the interests of the Minor Children, and keeping in mind that the parent-
time arrangement will apply not only now - when the Minor Children are in preschool - but 
also in the future as they proceed through grade school, middle school and high school, the 
following parent time plan is in the Minor Children's best interests. 
64. The Minor Children will be residing with and attending school near Carmen in Draper, and 
so any mid-week visitation by Greg may be difficult for him. However, the Court is 
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interested what is in the children's best interests, even though it might create some hardship 
for Greg. 
65. In addition to Greg's 50% visitation time during the summer as agreed to by the parties, Greg 
shall be entitled to the following parent time during the school year - i.e. from September I st 
through May 3151: i) one (1) uninterrupted week during Christmas break; ii) one (1) 
uninterrupted week during spring break; iii) one (I) uninterrupted week some other time 
during the school year at a time to be agreed upon by the parties; iv) alternating weekends 
beginning on Thursday at 5:30 p.m. and ending on Monday morning; iv) on alternate weeks, 
one (I) mid week overnight with the Minor Children from Thursday after school until Friday 
morning.2 
66. Under this plan, the Minor Children will stay with Carmen approximately 210 nights per 
year, i.e., 57% of the time, and with Greg approximately 155 nights per year, i.e., 43% of the 
time. 
67. When the Minor Children enroll in school full-time, the receiving custodial parent shall pick-
up the Minor Children after school on Mondays, Thursdays and Fridays. This is desirable as 
it will be less disruptive for the Minor Children. 
68. The parent receiving the Minor Children shall be responsible for the transportation. 
69. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-33, parental care is presumed to be better for 
the Minor Children than surrogate care. Therefore, in the event a parent is unable to care for 
2 In the interest of giving Greg as much time as possible with the Minor Children, the Court's schedule 
envisions mid-week (Thursday) overnights. However, in the event Greg is unable to provide transportation back and 
forth so that the Minor Children can be back for school on Friday morning, or for other logistical reasons, he may 
decline that overnight. He shall not be prejudiced in the event he decides not to take advantage of those mid-week 
overnight visits. 
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the Minor Children on his/her prescribed day, the custodial parent must first offer, upon 24 
hours notice, the other the right of first refusal to tend the Minor Children before utilizing day 
care services or non-family members to watch the Minor Children. If a party chooses to 
exercise his/her right to care for the Minor Children, he/she shall be responsible for all 
transportation. 
70. The parties shall follow the Advisory Guidelines set forth in Section 30-3-33, unless that is 
contrary to any of the findings or conclusions reflected herein. 
71. For holidays, the parties shall follow the schedules set forth in Section 30-3-35.5 until both of 
the Minor Children are 5 years of age and thereafter, Section 30-3-35 . 
72. Special consideration shall be given by each parent to ensure the Minor Children are 
available to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious 
holidays, important ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of the Minor Children 
or, in the life of either parent which may inadvertently conflict with the parent-time schedule. 
73. Parent-time schedules may be altered only if agreed upon in writing by both parties. For the 
purposes of this Agreement, a "writing" also includes emails or text messages. In 
developing and coordinating schedules, the parties shall be guided by the objectives of 
allowing each parent to develop and maintain a meaningful relationship with the Minor 
Children, providing them with a stable environment, accommodating their school and other 
schedules, and cooperating to accommodate both parties' employment schedules. 
74. If an emergency or other urgent situation arises and due to emergency circumstances the 
parent will be late or is unable to be present to pick-up or deliver the Minor Children then 
that parent shall notify the other as soon as possible to advise them of the circumstances and 
-26-
00695 
make appropriate alternate arrangements. 
75. For emergency purposes, whenever the Minor Children travel with either parent on a trip of 
greater than 80 miles or lasting greater than 36 hours, all of the following shall be provided to 
the non-custodial parent beforehand: i) an itinerary of travel dates; ii) destinations; iii) the 
location(s) where the Minor Children or traveling parent may be reached; and, iv) the 
name(s) and telephone number(s) of an available third person who will have information of 
the Minor Children's location and other relevant contact information. 
76. In the event of relocation by either party, the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-37 shall 
apply. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
77. Carmen works at a dental office and earns approximately $2,844 per month. 
78. Greg works part-time. He earns $13.00 per hour and works 25 hours per week, for a monthly 
wage of approximately $ I ,408 per month. 
79. The Court finds that Greg is underemployed. The Court notes that as Carmen will have the 
Minor Children for a significant portion of the week, Greg will have the opportunity, and is 
therefore, encouraged, to seek additional employment in order to adequately share in the 
expenses, care, etc., related to the Minor Children. Moreover, because Greg's criminal 
record has been expunged, he hopes that will no longer be an impediment to finding more 
work. The Court imputes a wage of $1,863 per month for Greg, which adds a minimum 
wage job for 15 hours a week in addition to his current earnings. In the event Greg is able to 
increase his monthly earnings above the imputed amount, he has an obligation to report that 
to Carmen and the child support numbers shall be adjusted accordingly. 
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80. The noted figures shall be used to calculate the child support obligation of Carmen and Greg 
using the joint custody work sheet, crediting Cannen with 210 overnights and Greg with 155 
overnights. 
81. According to the Child Support Worksheet, Greg's child support payment shall be $150 per 
month. See Ex. A, Child Support Obligation Worksheet. 
MARITAL DEBTS 
82. As of the March hearing, the debts, the name on the account, and the approximate amount 
owed on each debt were as follows: 
Discover card Cannen $4,725 
America First C. U. Greg $5,013 
Kohl's Carmen $ 405 
Capital One Carmen $ 75 
Student loan Greg $3,300 
Total $13,518 
83. The Discover card was incurred during the parties' relationship for household expenses. 
84. The America First obligation was for a loan to pay off Greg's's sister and credit cards. All 
of those obligations were marital debts incurred during the parties' relationship. 
85. The Kohl's credit card was used to purchase household items for the parties and the Minor 
Children. 
86. The Capital One credit card was used to buy household items for the parties and Minor 
Children. 
87. Although the student loan was taken out under Greg's name, it was generally used to pay 
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back household obligations. 
88. The Court finds and concludes that all of the debts at issue are marital debts and therefore, 
shall be paid equally by the parties. Neither party produced evidence demonstrating 
otherwise or demonstrating that the Court should treat these debts differently for some 
equitable reason. 
89. As marital debts should be valued at the time of divorce, and these numbers were given to the 
Court shortly before the bifurcated divorce was granted, they constitute a reasonable 
approximation of the amount of those debts. 
90. Each party will be responsible to pay the debts in their name. Greg will be responsible to 
pay the America First debt and the student loan (totaling approximately $8,3130.00); Carmen 
will be responsible to pay for the Kohl's, Discovery and Capital One debts (totaling 
approximately $5,205.00). 
91. Each party's share of the $13,518 debt is approximately $6,760. To equalize the debt, 
Carmen is to reimburse Greg $1,550. That amount is to be paid in monthly installments of 
$150 per month until fully paid. 
Attorney Fees 
92. Carmen seeks some of her attorneys fees incurred in this matter. Specifically, she seeks the 
attorneys fees necessitated by the rescheduled trial day. 
93. Both parties seek their attorneys fees generally incurred in this matter. A determination of 
attorneys fees is based on the need and reasonableness of the requesting party. O/iekan v. 
Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, ,i 17, 147 P.3d 464 (holding in relevant part that an award of 
attorney fees in a divorce action "must be based on evidence of both financial need and 
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reasonableness[.]" (citation omitted)). While each party credibly claims to have limited 
financial resources, neither has demonstrated a "need" as required. See Connell v. Connell, 
2010 UT App 139, ,I,I 27-30, 233 P.3d 836. 
94. Accordingly, neither party shall be awarded his/her attorney's fees and costs. Each party 
shall bear his/her own fees and costs incurred in this action. 
OTHER ISSUES To BE INCLUDED IN THE DECREE 
95. Each party is mutually restrained from disparaging the other party or from stalking, or 
harassing the other. 
96. Each party is mutually restrained from saying anything derogatory about the other in the 
presence of the Minor Children, from speaking to the Minor Children about any legal issues 
relating to the parties' relationship, or directing any third person to make such statements to 
the Minor Children. 
97. Each party is mutually restrained from involving the Minor Children in any conflict with the 
other party. 
98. Section 30-3-37 shall govern if either custodial parent intends to relocate, i.e., move 150 mile 
or more from the residence of the other parent. 
99. Any disputes arising or otherwise related to this order, shall first be submitted to mediation 
for potential resolution before being submitted to the Court for consideration. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the above findings and discussion, the Court makes the following Conclusions of 
Law: 
1. Joint legal custody of the Minor Children will continue, however, Carmen shall have the 
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ultimate decision making authority on all important matters as discussed above, subject to 
input from Greg. 
2. Joint physical custody of the Minor Children will continue, with Carmen being 
designated as the primary custodial parent. Greg's parent-time schedule is set forth 
above. That schedule shall take affect on September 1, 2015, after the parties' stipulated 
summer schedule ends. 
3. Greg shall be responsible for child support in the amount of $150 per month beginning 
September I, 2015. 
4. Carmen owes Greg $1,550 to equalize the parties' debts. She is required to pay Greg 
$150 per month beginning September 1, 2015, and continuing until paid. 
5. Each party is to bear his/her own attorney's fees and costs. 
6. The above findings and discussion are incorporated herein as conclusions of law. 
7. Carmen's counsel is ordered, within twenty (20) days of this Memorandum Decision, to 
draft an Amended Decree of Divorce in accordance with the noted findings and 
conclusions, to effectuate the Court's orders stated herein, and then to circulate the 
proposed order to Greg's counsel for review. In the event of any objection related to the 
form of the order, counsel shall first attempt to resolve the disputes before submitting the 
matter to the Court for consideration. 
8. This decision shall be deemed fully incorporated into any further decree and is considered 
the Court's final order. 
9. The Decree is to include all of the terms previously agreed to between the parties, 
including the agreed-upon terms for the 50/50 summer visitation. 
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I 0. The Decree is to include a restraining order to prevent the children from having any 
contact with the Rcspondcn( s uncle~ Jose ivf oreno. 
IT SO ORDERED this _;J_~y of June. 2015. 
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INTI-IF 
Carmen Pope· 
Cin:g Pope 
The Combin..:d Child Support Oblig;iuon T;1bk used for 
dculation is: (X) 7813-12- 30 1 
( ) 7813-12-301ll ) and 781!-12-302( I) 
( 11 istoric,11) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY, ST/\TI~ OF UT.I\! I 
CIII LD SUPPOiff OBLIGATION WORKSIJEET 
(.1O 1\'T l'II YSIC..\L CUSTODY) 
Civil No ___,,/_3 t __ 1_0 tf_/ 7~!-
.\IIOTIIER FATIIER COMBlNED 
I. E111cr th..: 1111111hcr of natural an<l ~doptc<l d11 ldr.:11 of tlus mother mid lilth..:r lor = 
whom support 1s 10 he awarded 1,, 2 ,~ 
2a. Enter thc l;nhcr's and mother's gross month!>· 111rnmc. Rcfi.:r to Instructions $284-1 $18(,3 li.,r <.kfinition or income. 
2b. Enter prc\·iously orckn:d al in1ern,· that is actual!>' pnid. ( n o not enter - .c r 
:ilimon>· ordered !cir this r:1scJ. $0.00 $0 00 
2<: Enter prcviously ordered child support. (Do nm enter ohligmions ordered 1\,r "' 
th..: children in L111e I) so.no SO.nl) 
2d. OPTION,\ I.: L:11tcr thL· amount fro111 Linc 12 or the Children in i'rcse·111 - - . 
Home \Vorkshe·ct for cnhcr parcm so $(1 
-
3 Subtract Lines 2b. 2c, and 2d from 2a This 1s the 1\Jjustccl Ciross Income• fo r 
s2.s,1-1 .oo $ 1.863 00 $4.707.00 
,hi ld support purposes. 
-1. Taki! the crnvlBINED r1gurc in Linc 3 and the lllllllherorcltildrc.:11 in Linc I $ 1,147.00 to the Support T;1hk. Find tlw l3asc· Comhincd Support Obligation. Enter it here 
5 Dividc e;1ch parc.:nt's ml.1u,t,J monthly gross in l.111c· 3 hy the COi'vlBINFD (i(J.,10% :;9_(i{J'1/,, 
adjusted monthly gross 111 I. inc 3. 
··~ 
6 Multiply Linc 4 by l.i1w 5 for each parcn1 w obtain each parc111's share or the S692 79 S45'1.2 1 B:isr Support Obligat1011 
7. Enter the number or overnights tht.: chlid1c11 will spend with each parent. 
(Tht:y must tota l 365). Each par.:nt must haw al lc;1st I 11 ov..:rnights to qua Ii I)' 21 0 155 365 
for .loilll Physkal Custody (U.C !\ 78B- I 2-2ll8) 
7h. l<kntif)· the parent \\'ho has the.: ch ild the ksscr 1111mhcr or ovcrmghts, and 
co11t inuc the rest of the calculat ion for 1h,n1. You wil l bc 111,1king adjustments lo Father 
the 11.:1 amount owed hy this parent. 
:fa For the p;ircnt who has the clulcl th<.: lt.:ssc r nu111hcr or ovcrn1gh1s multiply 
the numbt:r of overnight, that :ire' grc:1ter than 11 0 but k ss than 131 by .0027 10 0 05-1 0 
obtain a resulting figure and enter 111 thi: rcspt(IIVe (olumn. 
?(\> Multiply the result nn lim: 8,i. by the C,,mhincd Suppi•n Obl1gation on l111L' -l $(11 .9-l li1r this parL'!lt and .:.mcr th.:. 11umbt.:r 111 !he rcsp<.:L·ti\'<.: c\llu11111 
8c. Subtract the rc:spcL'll\"e dollnr nmmmt on !in, 8h. from this p;1ri:m's share 
or the Base Support Ohlig,n1011 found in the colt11n11 f\ ,r thts part:111 011 !me 6 to 
S'.192.27 dctcrminc th<.: amount ;1s 11H.lica1c:d hy IJ .C.1\ 781l-12-208 (3)(a) .1ml enter the 
amount in the rl'spcctiw rnlumn 
9a. Additional calculation necessary if both parrnts 11;1\·c the child for more 1h;111 
131 overnights (O1hcr\\"1Si: gc• 10 l111 L' IO)· For th,: p.iri:nt who h~s the t'l11 ld the 
k sscr numbc1 of owrnight:i 111ult1plv the numbi:r ("lf ovi:rn1gl11s that t.:xccc·d 130 0.2 1()() 
( 131 overnights or mo,c) by IJOS-l tn ob1;1i11 i.l rcsulung figure ;1ml t:ntcr it 111 thc 
respcc1 i1·c column. 
9h. Multiply thc r<:sult \Ill !me 9a by th..: Comh111,·d Support Obl1gat1011 n11 lim· -I S:!-1 0 87 for this parent and c111i:r em:h in thc r.:spL'<.:t1vc culu1111 1. 
<Jc. Subtra1:t th is parent's dnll;tr ammml on !me 'lb. from their resp<:ctivc anwunt 
as iclcntifi<:d 011 linL: Xe to detcnnine thl' amount as indi..:atcd by UC:\ S 15 1 .j(J 
7813-12-208 (:l)(b) :111J cntc r the n111011nt in thL' 1\·~pcL't1ve cnlumn. C,o to 11111: 10. 
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I 0. BASE CHILD SUPPORT A WARD: If the result in line 9c. is> O. then this parent is the obliger (and the 
other parent is the obligee). Enter the amount in line 9c. here. This is the amount owed by this parent to the 
obligee all 12 months of the year. If the result in line 9c. is< 0, then this parent is the obligee (and the other 
parent is the obligor). Enter the absolute value of the result in line 9C. here. This is the amount owed to this 
parent by the obliger all 12 months of the year. 
11. Which parent is the obliger? ( ) Mother (X) Father ( ) Both 
12. Is the support award the same as the guideline amount in line 10? ( ) Yes ( ) No 
$151 
If NO, enter the amount(s) ordered: $ ______ (Father) $ _____ _ (Mother) and answer number 
13. 
13. What were the reasons stated by the court for the deviation? 
( ) property settlement 
( ) excessive debts of the marriage 
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent 
( ) other:----------------------------------
Attorney Bar No.-------- ( ) Electronic Filing ( ) Manual Filing 12J07 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following 
people for case 134904171 by the method and on the date specified. 
MAIL: RUSSELL W HARTVIGSEN 623 E 2100 S SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84106 
MAIL: JORDAN PUTNAM 6740 S 1300 E STE 225 COTTONWOOD HEIGHTS UT 84121 
06/19/2015 /s/ SHERYL CAMPBELL 
Date: 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Printed: 06/19/15 17:01:43 Pa~(W~l 
Ruling and Order on Pending 
Motions 
B 
i~ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT L 
STATE OF UTAH 
FILED DISTRICT coua·, 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 2 2 2015 
SALT LAKE 
TY 
GREG J. POPE, RULING AND ORDER ON 
PENDING MOTIONS 
Petitioner, 
vs. Case No.: 134904171 
CARMEN R. POPE, 
Judge: BARRY G. LAWRENCE 
Respondent. 
The above entitled matter is before the Court on Petitioner's Request to Submit for Decision 
his Motion to Amend and Enter New Judgment, filed July 28, 2015, and Respondent's Request for 
Enlargement of Time, filed July 21, 2015. Having reviewed the noted Motion and Request, and 
being duly apprised of the matters pending, the Court hereby issues the following Ruling and Order. 
I. RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME 
The Court notes that although Respondent's proposed order on her Request for Enlargement 
of Time was issued as an Order of this Court on August 6, 2015, due to a clerical error the issued 
Order was incomplete. Accordingly, the Court clarifies the August 6, 2015, Order, as follows. 
Petitioner filed his Motion to Amend and Enter a New Judgment on July 6, 2015. Therefore, 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(c)(l), Respondent's opposition was due within 
fourteen (14) days after service, i.e., due on or about July 20, 2015. Respondent1, however, filed 
her Request for Enlargement of Time on July 21, 2015, one (1) day outside of the standards 
1The Court notes that throughout Respondent's Request she erroneously referred to herself as "Petitioner." 
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prescribed in Rule 6(b)(l)(A)2• Respondent sought an approximate eight (8) day extension due to 
a pending obligation in a juvenile court proceeding and as a result of a death in Respondent's 
counsel's family. (Resp't's Req. 2-3). 
In his Opposition3 to Respondent's Request, Petitioner asserts that pursuant to Rule 6(b)(2) 
this Court is prohibited from granting an extension of time when addressing Rule 52(b) motions. 
Petitioner also argues that because Respondent's Request was one ( 1) day beyond the prescribed time 
under 6(b)(l)(A), even if the Court had discretion to extend Respondent time, it could only do so 
pursuant to Rule 6(b)(l)(B)4. 
The Court finds that Petitioner has misconstrued Rule 6(b )(2), which states, "A court must 
not extend the time to act under Rules S0(b) and (c), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b)." Pursuant 
to the clear language of the Rule, the language precludes a court from extending time to those parties 
seeking to file an initial motion pursuant to Rule 50(b) and (c), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b), 
after the prescribed time has expired; it does not, however, preclude a court from acting on a motion 
to extend time in opposition to such motions. See Holbrook v. Hodson, 466 P .2d 843, 845 (Utah 
1970) ( explaining "Defendants' motion for a new trial was not timely filed under Rules 52(b) or 
2Provides in relevant part, "When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for 
good cause, extend the time: ... with or without motion or notice if the court acts, or if a request is made, before the 
original time or its extension expires[.]" 
3Petitioner notes in relevant part, in his "Statement of Facts" that (i) "Carmen [Respondent] hired new 
counsel to represent her on appeal[;]" and, (ii) "[Respondent's] appellate counsel never entered a notice of 
appearance." (Pet'r's Opp. 2). Respondent's counsel, Jared Putnam, filed his notice of appearance before this Court 
on or about November 6, 2014, and has been representing Respondent since that time. There is no indication in 
Respondent's Request that she retained "appellate counsel," nor, is there a need for Respondent to secure appellate 
counsel at this stage of the proceedings. 
4Provides in relevant part, "When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for 
good cause, extend the time: ... on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of 
excusable neglect." 
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":ii: 
59(b ), and under Rule 6(b) the trial court may not extend the time for taking any action under these 
rules except to the extent or under the conditions stated in them. The overriding principle of all the 
aforementioned rules is to assure the finality of judgments." (citations omitted)(emphasis added)). 
Finally, contrary to Petitioner's implication, the Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be liberally 
construed and applied to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 
U.R.C.P. 1. Accordingly, either under Rule 6(b)(l)(A) or 6(b)(l)(B), Respondent has established 
a viable basis, i.e., pending juvenile court proceeding, for seeking an extension5• See e.g. Berv v. 
Flying J, Inc., 2008 UT App 468, * 1 ("[E]xcusable neglect ... is an admittedly neglectful delay that 
is nevertheless excused by special circumstances." (citing Reisbeckv. HCA Health Servs., 2000 UT 
48, ,r 13, 1 P.3d 447)(emphasis added)); Swallow v. Kennard, 2008 UT App 134, ,r 23, 183 P.3d 
1052 ("The supreme court has previously defined 'excusable neglect' as 'the exercise of due 
diligence' by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." (citation omitted)); 
Reisbeck, 2000 UT 48 at 113 ( explaining that "good cause ... pertains to special circumstances that 
are essentially beyond a party's control." (citation omitted)). 
Based upon the foregoing, Respondent's Request for Enlargement of Time is HEREBY 
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court considers Respondent's opposing memorandum. 
II. PETITIONER'S MOTION TO AMEND AND ENTER A NEW JUDGMENT 
A. The Standards for Consideration 
Petitioner's Motion is submitted on the allegations that the Court's Memorandum Decision, 
5The Court notes that although Respondent sought an extension time until July 28, 2015, to submit an 
opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Amend and Enter a New Judgment, Respondent's Opposition was filed July 22, 
2015, approximately two (2) days after the prescribed deadline under Rule 7(c)(l). 
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Order, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued June 19, 2015 ("Decision"), "contain errors 
of law that necessitate amending ... or entering a new judgment." (Pet'r's Mem. In Supp. 1). 
Notably, Petitioner submits his Motion pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rules 52(b) and 
59. Id. Petitioner, however, fails to articulate and support the Rule 59 bases on which he seeks 
review. Nonetheless, even though the bases of Petitioner's argument in his Memorandum in 
Support is unclear, see e.g. Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24,186, 135 P.3d 861, based upon Petitioner's 
other arguments within his Memorandum, and giving the Petitioner the benefit of the doubt, the 
Court shall treat the motion as one made pursuant to U.R.C.P. 59(a)(7) (regarding alleged "errors 
oflaw") and U.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) (regarding the insufficiency of the evidence).7 
In addressing custody matters, Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-l0(l)(a) provides in 
relevant part: 
In determining any form of custody, ... the court shall consider the best 
interests of the child ... and, among other factors the court finds relevant, the 
following: 
(i) the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties; 
(ii) which parent is most likely to act in the best interest of the child, 
including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the 
noncustodial parent; 
(iii) the extent of bonding between the parent and child, meaning the depth, 
quality, and nature of the relationship between a parent and child; 
(iv) whether the parent has intentionally exposed the child to pornography or 
material harmful to a minor, as defined in Section 76-10-1201; and 
6Explaining, "[W]hen a party seeks relief from a judgment, it must tum to the rules to determine whether 
relief exists, and if so, direct the court to the specific relief available." 
7 Petitioner also maintains that the Court's findings in part, were "clearly erroneous." Jd. at 3-4. "Clear 
error," however, is the standard reserved by appellate courts in reviewing findings in child custody proceedings. See 
e.g. Linam v. King, 804 P.2d 1235, 1237-38 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that findings of fact in child custody 
case that are clearly erroneous must be set aside on appeal); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
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(v) those factors outlined in Section 30-3-10.28• 
(2015)(emphasis added). See also e.g. Tuttle v. Henderson, 628 P.2d 1275, 1276 (Utah 
1981 )( explaining that in any custody proceeding "the controlling factor is the best interest and 
welfare of the child." (citations omitted)(emphasis added)); Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 645 
(Utah 1980) ("A court must, in a custody dispute, give the highest priority to the welfare of the 
children over the desires of either parent." (citation omitted)(emphasis added)). Accordingly, 
A child's best interests must be determined 'by a preponderance of the evidence' 
based on a number of factors that compare the parenting skills, character, and 
abilities of both parents in light of a realistic and objective appraisal of the needs of 
a child[.] 
Woodward v. LaFranca, 2013 UT App 14 7, ,r 22, 305 P .3d 181 ( citations omitted)( emphasis added). 
In light of the noted standards, the Court addresses Petitioner's Motion. 
8Provides: 
In determining whether the best interest of a child will be served by ordering joint legal or physical 
custody, the court shall consider the following factors: 
(a) whether the physical, psychological, and emotional needs and development of the 
child will benefit from joint legal or physical custody; 
(b) the ability of the parents to give first priority to the welfare of the child and reach 
shared decisions in the child's best interest; 
(c) whether each parent is capable of encouraging and accepting a positive relationship 
between the child and the other parent, including the sharing of love, affection, and 
contact between the child and the other parent; 
( d) whether both parents participated in raising the child before the divorce; 
( e) the geographical proximity of the homes of the parents; 
(f) the preference of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as 
to form an intelligent preference as to joint legal or physical custody; 
(g) the maturity of the parents and their willingness and ability to protect the child from 
conflict that may arise between the parents; 
(h) the past and present ability of the parents to cooperate with each other and make 
decisions jointly; 
(i) any history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse, or kidnaping; and 
G) any other factors the court finds relevant. 
( emphasis added). 
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B. Findings Regarding Moral Character 
Petitioner first alleges: 
Throughout the Decision, several references were made to [Respondent's] 
unsupported assertion that [Petitioner] was a prostitute. Because this allegation is 
salacious, inflammatory, and deeply harming to [Petitioner] and because there was 
not a single scintilla of evidence produced to support it, this Court should amend the 
judgment or enter a new judgment entirely .... It was clearly erroneous for this Court 
[] to have considered [the prostitution allegation] in determining custody. 
(Pet'r's Mem. In Supp. 3-4). Petitioner has misconstrued the Court's findings. First, the Court did 
not make findings that Petitioner was a prostitute; on the contrary, the Court found that such 
allegations were "speculative." (Decision, 15). Moreover, in its assessment of the parties' moral 
character and emotional stability, the Court explained in part: 
17. 
18. 
There was additional testimony by [Respondent] about questionable events 
about [Petitioner] that led her to believe that he may be "prostituting" 
himself for money. Specifically, [Respondent] made allegations of 
[Petitioner's] involvement with transgender people and his involvement 
with pornography. 
While the Court found [Respondent] to be credible regarding some of those 
events - i.e., online dating and involvement with pornography - it was 
speculative that [Petitioner's] conduct was criminal as opposed to morally 
disdainful. And, there was nothing indicating that the Minor Children's well-
being or safety was ever at risk as a result of [Petitioner's] alleged activities 
. Additionally, [Respondent] concedes that she engaged in almost similar 
conduct, i.e., having a long distance on line relationship with a person and 
engaging in unspecified "phone sex." Finally ... there was nothing solidly 
linking [Petitioner] to defined criminal behavior[.] 
(Decision, 15). As noted, the Court recognized that both parties had, after their relationship soured, 
likely engaged in conduct which called into question their moral character, but neither had by their 
actions done anything illegal or which put the Minor Children's well-being or safety at risk. Id. In 
his Motion, Petitioner fails to consider the significance of the Court's findings in the totality under 
6 
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this particular factor. That is, although Petitioner protests regarding the "salacious, inflammatory, 
and deeply harming" (Pet'r's Mem. In Supp. 3) prostitution allegation, the Court did not base its 
ruling on that allegation. Indeed, the Court considered all evidence - including Petitioner's 
criminal episode in Maryland in which he brought his two (2) year old son to the commission of a 
crime. (Decision, 14). 
Additionally, Petitioner does not argue there was an insufficient basis for the Court's finding 
of the "lack of judgment that [Petitioner] showed in having his child present during the [ commission 
of a crime,]" id., which ended in Petitioner's arrest and the young child being taken into protective 
custody. Id. at 2. The Court's determination regarding the parties' moral character was based upon 
all the testimony presented during the approximate three (3) day bench trial. See Barnes v. Barnes, 
857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("The trial court is required to make adequate findings 
regarding the best interests of the child and past conduct and demonstrated moral character of each 
of the parents. It is also required to consider which parent is most likely to act in the child's best 
interest and to make findings regarding that consideration." ( citations omitted)( emphasis added)); 
Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("[The appellate courts] defer to the trial 
court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Furthermore, in a custody dispute, [ t ]he trial court is best 
suited to assess the factors upon which it based its determination, given its proximity to the parties 
and circumstances, and its opportunity to personally observe and evaluate the witnesses." ( citations 
and quotations omitted)). As explained above, the the Court's findings regarding Petitioner's and 
Respondent's moral character were supported by admissible evidence. 
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C. Findings Regarding Living Arrangements, Kinship, Financial Conditions 
and Schooling 
Petitioner also argues that there "is no reasonable basis" for the Court to conclude that 
Petitioner's leaving the Minor Children alone in the basement of his Mother's home between the 
hours of 9:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m. is "troubling." (Pet'r's Mem. In Supp. 5). The Court made this 
particular finding in its assessment of (i) personal versus surrogate care, in which the Court 
concluded that the factor currently favored Petitioner; (Decision, 17), and (ii) the parties' financial 
condition, in which the Court favored Respondent. Id. 18-19. Despite the Court's distinct findings, 
even finding in favor of Petitioner under the consideration of the factor of personal versus surrogate 
care, Petitioner now fails to present any contrary evidence that leaving children, ages six ( 6) and 
eight (8), alone for approximately five (5) hours at night, in the basement apartment9 of a home -
albeit with Petitioner's Mother upstairs in a separate area in the same building - is not in the best 
interest of the Minor Children. As noted, "A child's best interests must be ... based on a number 
of factors that compare the parenting skills, character, and abilities of both parents in light of a 
realistic and objective appraisal of the needs of a child[.]" Woodward, 2013 UT App 14 7 at ,r 22 
(citations omitted)(emphasis added). See also Carsten v. Carsten, 2007 UT App 174, ,r 5, 164 P.3d 
429 ( explaining "all of the factors a trial court considers must relate to, and bear on, the best 
interests of the children." (citation omitted)). 
Petitioner also alleges that the Court has made findings against "multi-generational" 
households. (Pet'r's Mem. In Supp. 8-9). In particular, Petitioner complains that the Court did not 
9The Court notes that Petitioner made it a point during his testimony, that although he resided in the 
basement of his mother's home, it was in a separate 1300 square foot, two-bedroom apartment, with a separate 
entrance. (Bench Trial, Mar. 12, 2015); (Decision, 4 ). 
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provide explanation as to the exclusion of Petitioner's mother's income in its consideration, even 
though it considered Respondent's fiance's income. Id. at 8. The relevant factors considered by the 
Court that Petitioner now complains of, include (i) kinship, including step-parent status and, (ii) 
financial condition. (Decision, 18-19). Both Petitioner and his mother, Deanna Taylor, testified 
during the bench trial. (Bench Trial, Mar. 12, 2015). However, neither Petitioner nor his mother 
presented evidence that Petitioner's mother contributed financially10 to the care/support of the Minor 
Children, or was involved in the daily care 11 of the Minor Children. Id; compare (Bench Trial, Mar. 
13, 2015) (during the cross-examination of Jeremy Barnes, Petitioner's counsel asked specific 
questions regarding Mr. Barnes' salary and potential future income). Accordingly, the Court cannot 
speculate or otherwise infer circumstances when evidence supporting such alleged circumstances 
was never presented at trial. 
Petitioner also disregards the Court's concern regarding Petitioner's ability to maintain his 
current lifestyle as the Minor Children mature. (Decision, 18-19). The Court specifically explained 
that it was unrealistic for Petitioner to continue to be voluntarily under-employed12 especially, as his 
10While Petitioner testified that he did not care whether he received child support in efforts to care for the 
Minor Children, (Bench Trial, Mar. 12, 2015), he also failed to present any evidence as to how he currently met his 
own and the financial needs of the Minor Children on a part-time salary averaging approximately $1,408.00 per 
month, to adequately cover the costs of rent, food, clothing, transportation, extra-curricular activities, school costs 
and fees, medical and dental costs, etc. 
11 Petitioner's mother, Deanna Taylor, testified that she did not provide any care for the Minor Children, 
i.e., Ms. Taylor testified that Petitioner provides "exclusive" care for the Minor Children. (Bench Trial, Mar. 12, 
2015). 
12Petitioner maintains that he voluntarily chooses to be under-employed because if he accepted full-time 
employment he would be unable to directly care for the Minor Children and therefore, would likely have to secure 
daycare for them. (Bench Trial, Mar. 12, 2015). Although Petitioner did not present any testimony that his mother 
currently or in the future, would be willing to provide surrogate care ifhe sought to obtain full-time employment, id; 
Petitioner's mother testified that she was employed full-time as a teacher/director of special education. Id. 
9 
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Minor Children mature and their needs likely increase and change. Id. See e.g. Tucker v. Tucker, 
910 P .2d 1209, 1214 13 (Utah 1996). As previously addressed, the Court must make its determination 
in the best interest and welfare of the children. See e.g. Tuttle, 628 P .2d at 1276. Petitioner has failed 
to present any evidence to establish that the Court's kinship and financial condition assessments 
were legally insufficient in light of the best interest and welfare of the Minor Children. See U.R.C.P. 
59(a)(6), (7). 
In yet another example, Petitioner alleges, "Because [the Court] concluded, without any 
evidentiary basis, that standardized test scores were more important than diversity, it ruled that the 
children change schools." (Pet'r's Mem. In Supp. 5). Nothing presented by Petitioner during the 
hearing or in his pending Motion demonstrates that a diverse student body is to be accorded greater 
deference than the academic achievements when considering schools for children. Aside from mere 
speculation from Petitioner that a school with a more diverse student body will offer more teaching 
and cultural opportunities for children, (Bench Trial, Mar. 12, 2015), Petitioner did not attempt to 
account for the obvious disparity of the academic success between the two (2) schools. Id. 
Additionally, Petitioner testified that he would not object to the Minor Children attending a school 
which may have a less diverse student body ifit offered better academic opportunities. Id. Petitioner 
13Explaining: 
In detennining pennanent physical custody of a minor chi Id, trial judges are accorded broad discretion. 
. . . The trial court's discretion stems from the reality that in some cases the court must choose one 
custodian from two excellent parents, and its proximity to the evidence places it in a more advantaged 
position than an appellate court. As this court has previously explained, the detennination of custody 
may frequently and of necessity require a choice between good and better. However, while the trial 
court has broad discretion, it must be guided at all times by the best interests of the child. 
( citations and quotations omitted)( emphasis added). 
IO 
00874 
fails to reconcile his current position in light of his proffered testimony. 
Petitioner continues to assert - without adequate evidentiary or other legal support - that 
"[o]ne of the most traumatic14 things that can happen to a young child is to change schools. They 
lose all their friends and academic support system." Id. at 6. While the Court does not dismiss the 
notion that a child changing to a new school would likely have to adapt to the new school, teachers, 
student body/classmates, routines, etc., no evidence was presented at the Bench Trial or in 
Petitioner's Memorandum, to support that the Minor Children would be "traumatized" or unable to 
adapt to the new school, new routines, make friends, or otherwise succeed academically at a new 
school. As amply discussed in case law in regards to any custody consideration, it is the best interest 
and welfare of the children a court must consider, not the desires of the parent(s). See e.g. Gribble 
v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 1978) abrogated on other grounds by, Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 
20, 154 P .3d 808, ("In proceedings to determine custody and/or visitation, the welfare of a minor 
child is of paramount importance, and divorce courts have broad equitable powers in safeguarding 
this interest." (citations omitted)); State in Interest ofFv. Dade, 376 P.2d 948, 949-50 (Utah 1962) 
("Quite beyond and more important than the rights and privileges of the parents is the welfare of 
[the] children and their prospects for becoming well-adjusted, self-sustaining individuals. This is the 
consideration of paramount importance." ( citation omitted)). 
14
"Trauma,, is defined in part as, "An emotional wound or shock that creates substantial, lasting damage to 
the psychological development ofa person[.]" The Am. Heritage Dictionary, 1904 (3d ed. 1996). 
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D. Testimony of Jeremy Barnes 
Finally, Petitioner alleges that he was prejudiced by the Court's failure to prevent 
Respondent's fiance, Jeremy Barnes, from testifying even though he was not excluded as a witness 
once the Court invoked the exclusionary rule. (Pet'r' s Mem. In Supp. 6-7). See Utah R. Evid. 615. 
In particular, Petitioner alleges that Mr. Barnes "was able to observe how everyone else testified. He 
could see which factors the trial court deemed important and adjust his testimony accordingly. As 
a result, he was able to bolster [Respondent's] case." (Pet'r's Mem. In Supp. 7). 
"The purpose of the [exclusionary] rule is to prevent witnesses from being influenced or 
tainted by the testimony of other witnesses, or other evidence adduced at trial." State v. Curtis, 2013 
UT App 287, ,r 22, 317 P .3d 968 ( citations and quotations omitted). See also Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT 
App 41, ,r 25, 97 4 P .2d 3 06 ("Trial courts have broad discretion in managing cases assigned to their 
courts which ... will not [be] interfere[d] with absent an abuse of discretion." (citation omitted)). 
Furthermore, it is the onus of the party alleging a violation of the Rule to show that he has been 
prejudiced by said violation. State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 954, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citations 
omitted). Mere allegations of prejudice are not sufficient to establish prejudice. See id. ("In the 
present case, defendants have not shown that the witnesses changed their testimony because of any 
conversations witnesses might have had before being excluded from the courtroom. Defendants 
merely allege that the witnesses could have modified their testimony. Their mere allegation is 
insufficient to establish prejudice.") 
First, the Court notes that contrary to Petitioner's allegation, (Pet'r's Mem. In Supp. 6), 
neither during the times when the Court invoked the exclusion during the Bench Trial nor, when Mr. 
12 
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Barnes was called to testify, did Petitioner object pursuant to Rule 615. 15 Now, Petitioner fails to 
explain how his alleged objection was not waived, in light of failure to timely object. See Utah R. 
Evid. 103(a); State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79, 1 10, 67 P.3d 1005 ("Where there [is] no clear or 
specific objection ... and the specific ground for objection [is] not clear from the context ... the theory 
cannot be raised on appeal. Moreover, it is well settled that a [party] who objects to the admission 
of evidence has the burden to make certain that the record [he] compile[ s] will adequately preserve 
[his] arguments for review .... One who fails to make a necessary objection or who fails to insure that 
it is on the record is deemed to have waived the issue." (citations and quotations omitted)). 
Notwithstanding, a court is granted discretion as to whether and to what extent a witness may 
be excluded. See Utah R. Evid. 615(c); Terry's Sales, Inc. v. Vander Veur, 618 P.2d 29, 32 (Utah 
l 980)("W hether and to what extent witnesses should be excluded is generally within the prerogative 
of the trial judge, and he should be allowed considerable latitude of discretion in making such orders. 
His actions thereon should not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that he abused his 
discretion; and in any event, a judgment should not be overturned unless it appears that the ruling 
was prejudicial." (citations omitted)). Also, Petitioner was represented by counsel at all times 
during the Bench Trial. Petitioner therefore, had ample opportunity to object or, to question Mr. 
Barnes regarding any testimony that was allegedly "bolstered," which he did not do. Now, Petitioner 
fails to present any evidence that the testimony presented by Mr. Barnes was adjusted to "bolster" 
Respondent's case or to otherwise prejudice the Court's best interest determination. (Pet'r's Mem. 
6-7). Compare Seel, 827 P .2d at 959. 
15 The Court cannot recall a formal objection being made, and Petitioner has failed to 
provide a transcript showing that an objection was actually made. 
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The Court requested Mr. Barnes to testify because he was engaged to marry Respondent, and 
would be living with and providing surrogate care for the Minor Children. The Court assessed Mr. 
Barnes' credibility and maturity to determine whether it was in the minor children's best interest to 
live with him. Accordingly, that testimony was relevant and necessary to the Court's decision. 
Moreover, that testimony on which the Court relied concerned whether Mr: Barnes' could properly 
act as a surrogate; that testimony was unaffected by any testimony Mr. Barnes could or would have 
heard from any of the other witnesses. Accordingly, Petitioner could not have suffered any prejudice 
by the (alleged) failure to exclude Mr. Barnes. See Seel, 827 P.2d at 959. 
Moreover, the Court's findings regarding Mr. Barnes are reflected in pages eleven (11) and 
eighteen (18) of the Decision. The Court found in part that Mr. Barnes "appears to have a good 
relationship with the Minor Children .... [ and] that [he] will likely act as a capable and caring step-
parent." (Decision, 18). Petitioner presents no evidence that is contrary to these findings. 
E. Conclusion 
As initially addressed, in a custody determination, the "controlling factor [ for consideration 
by a court] is the best interest and welfare of the child[ren]," Tuttle, 628 P.2d at 1276 (citations 
omitted)( emphasis added), not the desires of the parent( s ). Kallas, 614 P .2d at 645. Contrary to this 
standard and more telling of Petitioner's motives, Petitioner argues in his Motion that"[ e ]ach of the 
errors [he] described ... [were] harmful to Greg in shifting the balance to favor Carmen." (Pet'r's 
Mem. In Supp. 9)(emphasis added). Petitioner's arguments are not well-taken and fail to recognize 
the relevant legal standard - i.e., the best interests of the minor children. 
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Decision issued by 
14 
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the Court June 19, 2015, was based on error(s) in law or insufficient evidence. Accordingly, 
Petitioner's Motion to Amend and Enter a New Judgment is HEREBY DENIED. The Court's 
Decision of June 19, 2015, is AFFIRMED. 
This Ruling and Order stands as the Order of the Court as to the matters addressed therein. 
No further order is required. U.R.C.P.7(f). 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
J 
Dated this Z'Z' day of September, 2015. 
BY THE COURT: 
............... • 
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pn 10/30/2008, approximately 1000 hrs., I received a call from Ofc. B. Wolfe (FPD). When 
asked, Ofc. Wolfe advised that he was at Frederick Community College taking an extortion 
mplaint and needed CID assistance. With that, I responded to the college . 
Upon arrival, I made contact with Ofc. Wolfe and the reported victim who is identified as 
Mr . Rudy Clem Zimmerman-Howman . Horman advised that he received a note from an unknown 
person posted on his windshield this early morning which was parked in a parking space on 
Dominion Rd., Frederick, MD. The note specified that he was to place $5,000.00 in an 
€nvelope then place that item into a plastic bag with other trash. The bag was then to be 
deposited into a trash container which was located in the parking iot of a Middletown car 
wash by 1100 hrs. Failure to comply with this would result in damaging personal 
~nfqrmation on Mr. Horman being released . The note did not state the specific information 
;that was going to be used but ensured that the information would crush him should it come 
!to light. The writer~also stated that he (Horman) would not like anyone (IE law 
'enforcement) to take 'ii,· closer look on his computer and that his ties to LE were strong. 
reighbors, coworkers, · fri_ends, his students and family would all be informed if he 
,(Horman) failed to comply. If he complied, everything would be fine and his secret would 
remain secret. However, should he fail to comply, the information would be released and 
his life would be destroyed. Horman made the decision to contact the police at which 
time, Ofc. Wolfe responded and took his complaint. 
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riue-·tc:> the' t1me "constraints, r 'notifi°e.if'i:>et./Sgt. Degrange,···o-et. Morgan and Garcia as to 
the nature of the investigation. Garcia and Morgan acknowledged and took up observation 
~f the car wash in question located at the intersection of Alt. US 40 and Hollow Rd., 
Eiddletown, MD. Det/Sgt. Degrange relayed information from this det. and coordinated the 
:surveillance operation as the investigation progressed. Once all officers were in 
position, I along with the reported victim (Horman) responded to the drop off location. 
once I established observation of the car wash, I called Mr. Horman and advised him to 
.follow the instructions contained within the letter. He was to to deposit the package 
=into the 4th trash container 
located near the vacume station area and drive home. He acknowledged. He drove into the 
lot, exited his vehicle then placed the package into the trash bin. He got back into his 
yehicle and subsequently left the facility. As I followed the victim out of the facility, 
Sgt. Degrange radioed that a subject was going into the trash container th~t contained the 
pay off, retrieved the pay off and was now preparing to leave the facility. Degrange, 
µarcia and Morgan all converged on the car wash and tqok Mr. Pope into custody. Upon 
nearing this, I responded back to the scene. 
~-~on arrival, I identified myself and asked he if would like to speak with me about his 
rrent situation. Piior to doing this, I had to read him his Miranda rights. He 
~cknowledged. I then.informed him of said rights in which he verbally stated that he 
Maived his rights and would speak to me. Upon hearing this, I asked, "Why are you in the 
~ituation your in? Pope stated that he didn't really know the victim had had only seen 
him once before. He explained that Horman came into the Taco Bell (W. 7th St) a few 
months ago and a coworker told him about him and his lifestyle. And a l9t of weird 
things. P.ope thought nothing of it until he saw him again walking through the Whitter 
development a few days ago. He recognized him and saw the vehicle he was getting into and 
thought about what his coworker told him. He decided to try and get some money out of him 
based on the information he was told. He drafted a letter demanding money or he would 
release personal information about Horman and placed it on his parked car. He then waited 
~o see if Horman would follow through with the pay off. Horman did and that was how he 
~nded up where he was. I acknowledged. Horman was subsequently transported to FPD/CID 
:for additional processing. 
?lhile at FPO/CID offices, I asked Mr. Horman to look at Pope to see if they knew one 
another. Horman stated that he did not know the suspect in question and has never gone 
,into Taco Bell. However, he did remember a student telling him that he worked at a Taco 
Bell but doesn 1 t recall his name. 
A second interview with Pope was conducted while at FPO/CID offices. During this 
----------------------·•--" ----···- ... 
!()CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SH~ET ( FORM DC/CR 4A) 
.,_ 
DEFENDANT ··t 
. I SOLEMNL y AFFIRM UNDER THE PENAL TIES OF PERJURY THAT~ l 
· \TTERS AND FACTS SET FORTH IN THE FORE~~g~ENT E l,-1~::BQ~STr~~~/. BEU.. ~ 0~~~~~~~~~~~~00 
AGENCY SUB•A~ 1.0. NO. TRACKING NO 
BS 10 238 . 
IIIJ~~OOD~~~~~ill~JOOJffljOO~~~~~ 
CBF NO. . -·-· __ 
FORM DC/CR 4A (Rev. 7/94 ) 
~ 
., 
d"~ 
; LOCATED AT (COURT ADDRESS) 
DISTRICT COURT 
DATE: 10/30/2000 
14:41 
: TIME: ·-·-·-··-··- ..... i 100 W. PATRICK .ST. ·• ! '. C:ASENUMBER 
I : ; I 
t__ ---,,_•--===~---~~-~:.,=,., .... =-·"'".::.::.=-.:.=.--===-·=----···- __ __J L ··"·.:· .. ···-==:.;;.------==-==-=-~ 
• : uEFBIDANl'S NAME I LAST, FIRST, M.l I ~IS NAME 
~ ~ ; POP~_:_ ~~~~y .J ... ·-·· ... __ ·- .. ... . . . . . ..... -·. ··- .. . . . -~~~~~ GR~~-~~y. . . ---··- _ ... 
CONTINUATION SHEET 
STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
PAGE 3 
ARREST ON TRAFFIC/NATURAL RESOURCES CITATIONS/ 
CRIMINAL CHARGES/MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES/PUBLIC LOCAL LAWS 
---
OF 3 
---
fnterview he gave much of the same information listed above. He added that no one else 
was involved in the scam and that he did it only to get money to pay off some bills. He 
typed the letter yesterday and left it on the victim's vehicle that was.parked in the same 
·iocation when he first observed him walking a few days ago. He left it on the windshield 
pf the victim's gray hatchback at about 0130 hrs. this date and left. He did not intend 
to use any of the information he received as none of it was verified. The information 
;that was given to him~about Horman was that he was gay and liked to go out with other 
students. When asked;about the event itself, Pope advised that he observed Horman drive 
into the car wash, exit his vehicle then leave. He did not see him deposit the bag 
because the building was in front of it but decided to check it anyways. He went to the 
trash can he specified in his letter and located said bag. The can was full of trash but 
he located it on top and packaged the way he instructed. He was then arrested by FPD 
officers. 
Note: Pope retrieved the bag at approximately 1050 hrs. (10 min) prior to the cut off 
time indicated in the letter to Horman. The pay off bag found in Pope•s vehicle was 
located by Det. Garcia and identified by this detective as the bag Horman used to deposit 
into the specified trash can. 
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